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ABSTRACT 
 Corruption in Russian higher education is a significant problem with serious implications for 
human capital formation and the achievement of a knowledge economy. Higher education is a 
fundamental source of human capital production for the Russian Federation.  This function is realized 
by training students and objectively signaling graduates' future productive value.  The Russian higher 
educational system has fundamentally changed since the end of the Soviet Union, expanding on a 
massive scale, introducing new policy directions and allowing private universities to open.  
Unfortunately, this expansion has been accompanied by an increase in higher educational corruption.  
Corruption is a complicated topic that will be defined as any voluntary behavior, including the abuse of 
trust or authority that harms or trivializes the legitimacy and effectiveness of an otherwise impartial 
institution or organization.  This definition includes important aspects of corruption that are not 
commonly included in previous studies.   
 Russian higher education corruption is widespread and has roots in the Soviet Union.  In its 
myriad forms, higher education corruption socializes corrupt behavior and undermines both the training 
and signaling functions of a university in human capital production. The first kind of corruption that 
can be encountered in a university is financial corruption.  This is a prevalent problem, which involves 
the inappropriate use of university funds and facilities by administrators.  Selection corruption is the 
most widely perceived problem with Russian higher education.  This phenomenon is the securing of 
admissions for certain students due to bribery or the inappropriate use of influence.  Another form of 
corruption is the selling of course grades or exam results - known as grading corruption.  Accreditation 
corruption is the granting of professional credentials to doctors and lawyers in exchange for bribes or 
favors.  Academic dishonesty is also a form of corruption, but it is supplied by almost exclusively by 
students and a function of poor policing by instructors.  This is corrupt in the sense that it works in the 
same was as grading corruption, selection corruption and accreditation corruption, but the 
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responsibility lies with the non-authority.  Diploma mills are comprehensively corrupt institutions that 
subvert all objective goals and functions of a university. 
 The socialization of corruption has many negative effects in terms of spreading corruption 
among new actors.  However, the socialization of corruption may not be caused by higher educational 
corruption alone.  Secondary education corruption, family life and ubiquitous Russian social corruption 
are all alternative sources of such behavior.  These influences are significant, but higher education has a 
unique role that makes its influence worth special consideration.  Spreading corruption has serious 
political, economic and social consequences for a nation.  These range from institutional failure to 
squandered economic growth and regime instability.  The loss of human capital due to a dysfunctional 
education system is significant in many ways, including brain drain, labor market distortions and the 
denial of human capital's economic benefits.  These consequences render higher education corruption 
in the Russian Federation a prevalent and threatening phenomenon that could do serious damage to the 
nation. 
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1.) INTRODUCTION 
 1.1.) Research Focus 
 Modern theories of economics and social science depend on a series of critical 
assumptions regarding the logically predictable foundations of the environments in which 
individuals live and act.  The primary assumption is that these institutions do, in fact, function 
as they were intended to do. The police sincerely protect fellow citizens, the army defends the 
country, doctors heal the sick to the best of their abilities, civil servants work in the interests 
of their country and universities impartially educate students and verify their knowledge.  
Corruption calls into question all of these examples and makes the idea of approaching any 
social question in a scientific manner a fundamentally difficult endeavor.  Corruption is often 
cited as being a drag on an economy, essentially a loss of effectiveness or an increase in 
transaction costs for those that take part.  This explanation, however, misses some major 
implications of corruption. 
 Corruption is a loss of state effectiveness in the greatest degree, because the interests 
of the office or official in question become fundamentally subverted by the competing, 
personal interests of corrupt parties.  This kind of subversion prevents the state apparatus from 
working effectively, and it also impedes the ability of others to depend on the state for 
necessary service.  Considering the degree to which many critical services in the Russian 
Federation are socialized, the potential implications of corruption are much higher than 
simply increasing the costs of economic activity or resulting in consumer harm.  The loss of 
critical services can put large sections of the population at serious physical risk due to 
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abandonment and deprivation, which can become even more serious due to the predatory 
behavior of some authorities.   
 In a traditional industrial economy, corruption can indeed make transaction costs more 
expensive and reduce the productivity of given institutions, but the costs for a modern, 
knowledge-based economy are more substantial.  In order for human capital to be developed 
and realized, a series of institutions need to function together.  Higher educational institutions 
need to provide necessary knowledge to students while fulfilling rudimentary signaling 
functions.  Economic regulations need to allow for fair and smooth market entry as well as a 
legal system for protecting the rights of market participants and peaceful conflict resolution.  
Corruption defeats all of these purposes and renders the market closed and restricted in terms 
of reacting to consumer demand and allowing firm development.   
 The premiere model for economic growth, a knowledge economy, is dependent on 
knowledge transmission via higher education and the effective use of human capital.  
Whereas an industrial economy and democracy require a minimal level of education and 
literacy, an advanced, knowledge economy requires higher education.  For those nations that 
lie on the edge of a developed economy or a developing economy, the term "transition 
economy" applies.  These nations are most often represented as by Brazil, Russia, India and 
China.  For these nations, resource wealth and large human resources provide the base for 
high-levels of growth, but not for the opportunity to finally emerge as a global economic 
leader in the knowledge economy.  In this case, the Russian Federation poses an interesting 
test case to examine the underlying assumptions of how a transition to a developed, 
knowledge economy is accomplished.  The creation of a knowledge economy does not rely on 
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a further expansion of physical capital, but on the use of higher education to develop 
knowledge resources in human capital.  The degree to which this institution functions without 
corruption is essential in determining Russia's ability to achieve its goals and economic 
development. 
 1.2.) Research Question  
 The purpose of exploring this topic is to understand the implications of higher 
education corruption for the development of human capital for a knowledge-based economy.  
This is an issue of potentially great importance, but it has not been studied in great detail1.  In 
order to best approach this question, it is essential to further define the area of this 
investigation.  Due to its critical role in shaping human capital and a knowledge economy, 
higher education will be considered exclusively.  Higher education will be defined as post-
secondary education in pursuit of an academic degree, with either professional goals or future 
study as a goal upon completion of one's education.  This question will be approached by 
examining the role of education in human capital production so as to best frame the 
implications.  Then, Russian higher education system will be examined so as to determine the 
environment for this study.  Next, the concept of corruption, a consistently contentious term, 
will be defined and applied to higher education.  The individual types of higher education 
corruption will be defined and explored in terms of their mechanisms and implications.  Then, 
the implications for corruption will be examined in detail, and any mitigating factors will be 
addressed.  In order to achieve this, the research question must be precisely defined. 
 The goal of this thesis is to explore the implications of corruption in the Russian 
higher educational system from 2000-2010.  A key aspect of this topic is its regional 
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character.  Higher education, like many aspects of the Russian Federation, is a difficult topic 
to understand in terms of another country's expectations or traditions.  In recent years, the 
institutional, political and cultural areas of many post-Soviet states have grown far from 
Moscow's control, with their own relative levels of corruption2 .  In fact, some states - such as 
Kyrgystan, Ukraine and Armenia - have since adopted substantially different policies since 
the fall of the Soviet Union, which contribute to a broad range of unique and unrelated 
national corruption levels3.  The practice of treating Russia or any other country in the region 
as representative of all post-Soviet nations is no longer as effective a means of determining 
the nature of a specific social phenomenon in an individual country as it was in the 1990s. 
 A focus on the last ten years is essential to the design of this research project.  The 
Soviet Union's higher educational system strongly differed from that of the present-day 
Russian Federation in many crucial ways.  From specific political and cultural goals to 
fundamental differences in educational philosophy, the Soviet system of higher education 
cannot be truly compared to the system in modern Russia.  The massive scale of institutional, 
social and economic changes from 1991 to 2000 produced a very unstable environment for 
both education and a labor market, described at times as "undeniable misery"4.  This 
environment was characterized by extreme systemic shocks and uniquely unstable market 
conditions, where traditional educational value was not considered essential.  The educational 
system was thus subject to immediate and unpredictable change. The educational system's 
major, patchwork restructuring prevented any system-wide evaluation of higher education as 
a whole until the results of such reforms could have time to develop and be observable.  Even 
though some of these imbalances and difficulties persist, the educational environment has 
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stabilized sufficiently to allow for analysis to take place5.  Even though corruption existed 
before the Putin era, the identification of corruption as a specific cause of educational 
weakness was exceptionally difficult, considering the overwhelming systemic weaknesses and 
disorganization of the time.  
 Another important factor to consider is the implications, or value, of a functioning 
higher educational system.  Higher education corruption's implications are especially worthy 
of consideration, since its implications are potentially more serious than corruption in other 
areas6.  Implications will not be analyzed numerically or quantitatively, because higher 
educational value often defies traditionally measurable economic indicators.  They will be 
approached in terms of how higher educational corruption can cause the spread of corrupt 
behavior throughout a society.  Furthermore, the implications of this paper will be 
conceptualized by identifying the value of functional, productive and non-corrupt human 
capital production with the corresponding potential loss to due to the absence of such a 
system.  There are important qualities of education outside of these two roles that often defy 
many attempts at objective conceptualization and measurement, especially when questions of 
educational values are examined by a non-native member of the culture.  To this end, the 
socialization of corruption and human capital formation are the primary implications to be 
examined. 
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2.) THE ROLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION 
 2.1.) Human Capital Definitions and Its Role in Economic Growth 
 Human capital, the productive value of human actors in an economy, has been the 
subject of numerous definitions, and a precise conceptualization is essential to answer this 
research question satisfactorily.  Adam Smith's classical definition of human capital still 
carries great significance today.  His original conception emphasizes the similarities between 
individuals at an early age, and then sees their later differences as a product of years of 
education and experience7 8.  This theory was expanded on and refined by Schultz to be 
defined as a "variety of talents... acquired through different activities, such as education and 
work experience”9.  In other definitions, there is some variation as to how durable acquired 
skills and traits are, and to the source of those very traits, but all converge on the value of such 
characteristics' economic outputs10.  Another definition of human capital that is more specific 
to the modern economy will be examined: human capital is the value that workers add via 
their skills and knowledge, which are either acquired on the job or via education11.  In other 
words, human capital is an economically significant resource that can function like any other 
economically valued unit of input but distinct in its inextricable relationship to an individual. 
 The value of human capital is realized in congruence with other forms and principles 
of capital.  It is influenced by the same principles as any other type of economic value-
carrying unit, such as investment, development, cost and returns.  Therefore, it is possible to 
measure the value of an economy's workforce by looking at the skills and abilities of the 
individuals that make it up.  In its most basic form, human capital is a measurement of human 
resources in a given economy, thereby making any human capital development strategies an 
6 
investment in human resource development12.  Human capital development is dependent on 
the assumption that the capabilities of a given workforce are comparable to and 
complementary with other aspects of an economy13, such as industrial capacity or institutional 
strength.  A comparison with industrial capital is not entirely representative, since modern 
human capital requirements are more often shown to define knowledge as synonymous with 
human capital14, not necessarily the ability to operate industrial processes.  Overall, human 
capital behaves as any other special component of a functioning economy, being an essential 
component but not independently determinant of overall value.  It is in this context that the 
consistent and classical valuation of human capital can be seen. 
 The classical form of human capital investment and returns via education are 
measured as an individual's time spent acquiring knowledge and skills versus unearned wages 
during the same time15 16.  This rationale applies to individuals that seek to increase their 
labor market attractiveness by investing in their own ability to earn wages, thus deferring 
potential current earnings for greater wages later on17.  When applied across an entire 
economy, multiple investors in human capital can raise the overall human capital level o
given economy in areas such as research and high-level specialization.  Schultz's examinatio
of human capital suggested that cultivating this particular economic quality would lead to 
long-term growth benefits for any economy that had high levels of human capital, which was 
later asserted by Denison in 1962 and Nafukho in 2004
f a 
n 
18.  For the purposes of this 
examination, human capital contributions will be measured in several ways.  First of all, 
human capital will be evaluated as a source of economic growth and as a contribution to the 
goal of attaining a "knowledge economy."  Secondly, human capital will be considered in 
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terms of its ability to benefit institutional strength and its relationship to corruption. In o
to apply higher education's nuanced corruption scheme to this topic, a detailed conception of 
human capi
rder 
tal is necessary. 
 2.2.) The Role of Higher Education in Human Capital Development 
 Education is seen as the traditional form of human capital development.  A nation's 
overall levels of human capital quality are often directly related to the quality of its 
educational system19.  Without education, certain essential labor market skills, such as 
literacy and numeracy, would not be guaranteed in a given workforce.  These basic skills, 
however, do not present a complete picture of human capital20 therefore an examination 
advanced education is also essential.  This relationship is important in the sense that higher 
education both produces new human capital and maintains existing human capital via 
cultivating and renewing existing specialists
of 
 
 
el 
s a detailed 
examination. 
21.  This need is seen in Russian firms' constant 
need to improve human capital levels, despite earlier investments, so as to be able to stay 
competitive22.  Given the value of advanced training, it appears rational that the Russian 
Federation initiated a series of educational reforms for the specific purpose of increasing the
national supply of human capital, beginning in the 1980s23.  However, despite these reform
efforts, Russia's human capital approach is still geared towards the industrial-worker mod
that was seen in the Soviet Union24.  This kind of human capital production cannot aid a 
country in reaching the goal of being a modernized knowledge economy, which can only be 
achieved via a robust and effective higher education system.  As the guarantor of human 
capital, higher education's specific role in this area of development require
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 The two essential components of human capital are knowledge and skill25.  
Knowledge is a measure of potential human capital productivity.  The other component of 
human capital, skill, is the practical application of one's ability, either directly via production 
or indirectly via organization.  Knowledge is an excellent investment and means of advancing 
an economy, but without the skill of entrepreneurs, managers and technicians, knowledge 
cannot fully benefit the economy that commands it. Therefore, education and training are 
conceptualized as investments in the future production value of an economy26.  Whereas 
knowledge could be considered a form of long-term investment, skills are a measure of 
immediate productive value.  Given this kind of approach, knowledge can also be considered 
long-term, unrealized skills.  Schooling is the standard method of knowledge transmission, 
which is then measured and acknowledged by achievement tests and academic degrees.  The 
role of education in this kind of human capital development is significant.  The two 
components of human capital value are mutually reinforcing and valuable in their own right, 
but in order to understand the role of higher education in human capital formation, skills and 
knowledge must be understood in terms of shaping the key actors in a human capital-driven 
economy via training, soft skills and signaling. 
  2.2.1.) Training 
 Human capital's two components are realized and measured differently, but they can 
be acquired in the same way - training.  Whereas knowledge is transmitted via universities, 
skills are acquired almost exclusively at work via training and experience.  Many students do 
not graduate with the necessary skills to function in the labor market, which leaves firms at a 
disadvantage27 if they lack their own training programs.  According to some estimates, almost 
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90% of professional skills and productive value are acquired on the job itself28.  Being the 
guarantor of productive ability, greater importance is given to work experience over academic 
accomplishment in hiring for higher-level positions in both American and Russian firms29.  In 
fact, according to a recent study of the Russian labor market, work experience is seen as 
slightly more important than a higher education30.  This is so because the specialization 
inherent in many companies requires much more specified skills than the standard theoretical 
approach in Russian university curricula31.  Labor market expectations such as punctuality, 
initiative, workplace discipline, communication protocols and business culture are often 
acquired on the job.   
 This is reflected in the finding that Russian students do not actualize the training that 
they receive in their universities, since only 13% of Russian students expect to work in their 
major of choice32.  These expectations are often proven true, as most Russian students do not 
ultimately achieve a career in their area of university study33 - thus obviating the profession-
specific training role of higher educational institutions completely.  This training disparity is 
often compensated by individual firms' training programs34.  Such training programs can 
account for much of the human capital growth within a workforce35.  This training is provided 
to both low level and high level workers as a means of better preparing them to meet their 
job's requirements36.  The trend of private organizations supplying their own training is 
especially important in Russia37, since the ability of state institutions to provide high-level 
training was fundamentally undermined in the chaotic 1990s38.  This situation makes for an 
unexpected situation for educators, whose formal instruction appears to have little value in the 
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workforce.  Given this complication, it is important to examine what skills, if any, are instilled 
in students besides hard skills. 
  2.2.2.) Soft Skills 
 There are non-technical skills and characteristics, each products of education, that can 
determine an individual's human capital value.  These skills, called "soft skills" include such 
characteristics as perseverance, resourcefulness, integrity, sociability and leadership skills.  
Higher education is an important part of developing soft skills in a student via personality 
development and interpersonal skill formation39.  It could be argued that, considering the 
overwhelming importance of work experience in developing professional, "hard" skills, 
higher education's primary contribution to human capital training is actually fostering soft 
skills in graduates.  In this sense, it is important to examine how and why soft skills are 
influenced by higher education. 
 Soft skills are influenced by higher education in several key ways.  First of all, a 
university or other higher educational institution will influence a student's development in 
terms of behavioral conditioning.  Some especially valuable soft skills, such as independence 
and self-reliance are developed by higher education institutions40.  Universities educate 
students via socialization in many ways, especially in terms of fostering human capital41.  The 
overall change in personal identity as a result of receiving a degree from a given institution 
also has a shaping effect on an individuals' behavior and values42.  If, for example, professors 
are helpful and accommodating, then students may develop a more sympathetic view of 
authority figures and hierarchies.  If, however, a student's efforts are regularly frustrated by an 
incapable organization or if a student perceives the institution in question as being a hindrance 
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to her personal advancement, then she may develop a much more confrontational or hostile 
attitude to future institutions.  In terms of basic incentivization, a student may be conditioned 
to behave honestly, if such behavior is rewarded, or dishonestly if the opposite is true.  This 
kind of institutional influence is important in the sense that it conditions future graduates to 
behave in ways that may allow them to damage society due to the amount of responsibility 
that they will have later in their careers.  More than any other institution, education can 
influence the moral development of a nation's youth43.   
 The shaping value of higher educational institutions cannot be denied.  Institutions are 
essential determinants in shaping future student behavior44 and in terms of employment and 
individual career success.  This kind of influence can be seen with the University of Michigan 
Law School's affirmative action program.  Recently, the prestigious university's law school 
suffered widespread criticism for its policy of deliberately favoring students of traditionally 
underrepresented ethnicities in consideration for admissions.  In order to better address a 
seemingly exclusive admissions policy, a study was conducted examining the career 
outcomes of students that benefited from this affirmative action policy.  If, for instance, they 
were truly undeserving, then their career outcomes would reflect that via failures and career 
setbacks.  However, upon greater examination, there was absolutely no difference in terms of 
career success45 between affirmative action students and other graduates.  Minority students, 
possessing apparently lower levels of academic ability as represented by their test scores and 
transcripts upon admission, were competing equally and effectively with their non-minority 
peers in the workplace.  Therefore, if the measurements of academic ability for incoming law 
students can serve as a reliable indicator of ability, then either the institution must have 
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shaped its graduates to such a degree that initial differences were removed by the unique 
education and opportunities provided by this institution, or all necessary skills were acquired 
in the market as a result of favorable signaling.   
 In terms of the shaping effect of the institution, this type of experiment can find 
parallels in Russia.  Russian students were found to have markedly pro-Western mentalities 
upon entering a university, but this would be substantially reduced in scale by the time a 
student graduated46.  In essence, the longer a Russian student stays in the higher educational 
system, the more their values come to resemble those that are considered to conform with 
national characteristics47.  Therefore, an institution of higher education can play a decisive 
role in both establishing a career and shaping students' later behavior.  This conclusion, 
however, must be better supported and tuned to the specifics of the Russian higher 
educational system in order to be considered applicable. 
 Russian institutions of higher education also play an important role in shaping the soft 
skills and career outcomes of their students.  In terms of career prospects, the traditional 
university powerhouses of the Russian Federation appear at the top - MGU (Moscow State 
University) - Lomonosov, SPbGU (Saint Petersburg State University),  Baumann, and so 
forth48.  An interesting recent development in this area is the appearance of a new source of 
career prospects - the FSB Academy in Moscow49.  Graduation from these universities 
provides a student the best possible job opportunities50 outside of being granted one by a 
relative or an acquaintance.  Provided that having connections isn't a ubiquitous trait for 
students of such universities, it can be argued that entering students are, in fact, shaped by the 
environment in which they study, for better or worse.  For many, in fact often for the most 
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academically talented students from outside Moscow and Saint Petersburg, having 
connections in major government structures and businesses upon entering a university cannot 
be expected.  Now, the means of institutional change for individuals in both Russia and the 
American examples may be different, but the overall conclusion remains the same - students' 
futures and ability to succeed in the labor force is shaped by their higher educational 
institutions to a significant degree.  If, however, this is not a solely function of soft skills, then 
the inherent value of the university degree must play a role. 
  2.2.3.) Signaling and Elite Renewal 
 Higher Education plays a key role in not only shaping labor market candidates, but 
also in signaling the value of graduates.  This kind of process is accomplished via signaling, 
an objective evaluation of the societal value of graduates, relative to a university's prestige 
and evaluation criteria51.  One's workforce determines productivity, but higher education 
determines a candidate's teachability52.  There are several ways that universities of all kinds 
are able to signal the overall human capital value of their graduates.  Degree granting, grades 
and specialty selection provide a supposedly impartial guarantee of the successful transfer of 
knowledge and skills to students, thereby assuring that each graduate has a standard value. 
This kind of valuation, also known as credentialism for elite renewal, can incentivize 
corruption53.  On the other hand, this signaling function is very valuable for firms in the 
modern labor market when it's properly functioning, because higher education valuation is 
considered to be an essential part of the overall human resources strategies of many 
companies54.   This signaling effect can retroactively produce effective training for those that 
benefit.  By gaining access to the best employment opportunities or a higher ability to learn, 
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the organizational training that's afforded would theoretically be more effective as well.  This 
kind of effect could qualify signaling as a kind of "calibrating" for human capital that best 
designates and adapts individual actors for future training.  Despite this valuable function, 
higher education must provide some skill formation services.  If signaling is the only primary 
product of higher education, then it does not actually contribute to human capital 
development55.   
 Signaling is a key part of the value of higher education, especially in terms of elite 
renewal.  In fact, the perpetuation and regeneration of Russian society is dependent on higher 
education in most areas56.  This ensures regular elite renewal on a seemingly meritocratic 
basis.  This is reflected in opinions of elites' capabilities as related to the prestige of their 
educational background57.  In fact, a popular means for elites to effectively distinguish 
themselves from their peers is the attainment of doctoral degrees58.  Business elites have 
begun to educate their children overseas so as to avoid stigma and ensure a higher quality 
education than what the Russian market provides59.  Therefore, Russian higher education's 
signaling and training role may be mitigated for private sector elites, but it is still the primary 
choice for governmental elites and bureaucrats60.  After all, elite universities should select the 
most capable candidates and then transform them into the best qualified specialists.  This is 
reinforced by the Michigan case, in which it could be possible that the performance of  
student is enhanced by the institution or that the graduate's signaling advantage gives them the 
ability to acquire the best skills at the workplace.  Therefore, through signaling, training and 
productivity increases are achieved, albeit indirectly.  Since the value of human capital is 
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highly dependent on the system that produces it61, it is important to examine potentially 
influential characteristics of Russian higher education. 
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3.) ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE RUSSIAN HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM 
 3.1.) Primary Features of Russian Higher Education 
  3.1.1.) Statistical Data 
 The Russian Federation has one of the largest and most accessible higher education 
systems in the world.  More Russian students are flocking to universities than ever before62, 
even more per capita than for the entire Soviet Union63.  Even with these record setting levels, 
the number of students entering institutions of higher education has continued to increase in 
recent years64.  Russia now has one of the highest percentages of its population enrolled in 
higher education per capita65, even more than France, Germany and the UK66, representing 
620 students per 100,000 citizens67.  Ph.D candidates have also grown by 100% from 1995 to 
200468.  This sudden growth could have been prompted by a recent change in beliefs about 
higher education now being more accessible to the masses than in the past69.  Another 
possible explanation for this increase is that more Russian families are able to financially 
support a student family member who does not work70.  To meet this demand, the number of 
Russian higher educational institutions has mushroomed to incredible levels, with nearly 
1,400 functioning today71.  Along with this trend, many private higher education institutions 
have been opened72, but suffer from second-class status73. 
 Despite this encouraging trend of increased interest in higher education, the overall 
level of higher education quality has dropped as a result74 75.  In this regard, the Russian 
government has taken the initiative to close many poorly performing universities and 
colleges76 77.  Another important part of the Russian higher education system is the fact that it 
has traditionally been exclusively state-controlled and free.  During the Soviet Union, all 
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university education was free to those that were selected for enrollment, and this guarantee 
continues today for state institutions.  Private institutions can provide free education in special 
cases, but this is not expected. The constitution of the Russian Federation guarantees free 
higher education to all Russian citizens, even though a law was introduced in 2004 that 
allowed for tuition-paying enrollment as well.  This kind of system and its historic roles have 
greatly shaped modern higher education. 
  3.1.2.) Structural Features 
 Russian higher education is thoroughly traditional in several key ways, including 
determining curricula, the selection of students and the rigidly hierarchical organization of 
individual universities. Most decision making in higher educational institutions occurs within 
a clearly defined and one-way hierarchy78.  This is mirrored in the national system, since the 
federal government in Russia is the primary guarantor of higher educational standards and 
curricula79.  Since the standard Russian university is public and exists on subsidies, its official 
ability to function independently from the state is very low.  Any reform or change in Russian 
higher education policy must come from above, which greatly limits the academic flexibility 
and independence for Russian institutions that has become so prized by their Western 
counterparts.  In some situations, this rigid control over curricula prevents the realization of 
important curriculum reforms80. 
 Despite this hierarchy, centralized control has allowed for the government to 
unilaterally overcome institutional inertia so as to pass key reforms, such as the Unified State 
Exam - the EGE - to reform traditional selection processes81.  The selection of Russian 
students occurred in a very impractical way until this new exam was fully realized in 2010.  
18 
This system, a holdover of the Soviet era82, required students to physically travel to a 
university, where they take an entrance exam at a set time, which is administered by the 
university that they hope to attend, over a period of time up to one week.  Then, following the 
grading of their exams and the determination of their admissions status, the students were 
informed of the decision.  By entering via university exams a student then proceeded to study 
for free and received a minute stipend from the state for living expenses83.  Aside from 
greatly restricting the breadth of choices available to students, this system put substantial 
financial strains on aspiring students, since they often would need to travel to and live in a 
capital city for a given period of time while taking the exam and awaiting its result84.  This
economic burden priced out many potential students from less affluent Russian provinces.  
Despite the persistence of such traditions, new developments in the Russian higher education 
environment have reshaped some fundamental aspects of the Soviet higher educatio
 
nal 
 the 
e 
system. 
 Despite its state-centered history, some actors in the modern Russian higher 
educational system operate very close to market-driven entities.  For many in the field, 
Russian universities are increasingly viewed less as a state entity than a for-profit service 
provider85, which reflects an overall trend of university commercialization86.  First of all, 
many Russian universities instituted tuition-based enrollment in order to raise funds in the 
1990s87, which began in earnest in 199288.  These tuition levels vary with the demand of
university, reaching as much as 250,000-300,000 RUR ($10,000-12,000 at 25 RUR per 
dollar) for Moscow State University and the Higher School of Economics89.  Despite thes
high prices, only the most elite universities have restrictive tuition rates, and only 5% of 
19 
Russian students have student loans90.  In today's Russia, at least half and as many as two 
thirds of all students in state higher education institutions study on a tuition basis91 92.  In 
private universities, this number was estimated to be nearly eighty percent in 200593.  De
this trend, a large majority of Russian students would of course prefer to study as a free 
student than as one who pays tuition
spite 
 in 
d as 
 
 
is 
haracteristics has been met with opposition in both 
94 due both to cost and to the corresponding loss of 
prestige associated with having to pay for one's education95.  Along with initiating tuition 
programs, many Russian universities had to take on active market-based policies to survive
light of the sudden absence of state support in this same period96.  One side effect of these 
new policies is the increasing influence of local businesses and elites, who have emerge
major sources of funding97.  Russian universities change enrollment limits and majors 
depending on student demand98.  This new market view has been accompanied with an 
entrepreneurial trend of opening universities as profit-making opportunities.  Despite this 
major expansion of the educational market, the labor market for educational professionals has
not experienced similar growth.  There is a severe shortage of teachers and professors in the
Russian Federation, which does not allow for institutional or professional renewal99.  Th
transition to a system with market c
professional and public spheres100. 
 3.2.) Primary Features of Russian Higher Education 
 An important characteristic of the current Russian higher educational environment is 
private universities.  In the Russian Federation in 2008, there were 700 state institutions, but
650 private ones .  However, private universities are actually substantially similar to state 
universities in many regards.  First of all, even though private universities are theoretically 
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more independent than state universities, they still must meet the same accreditation criteria
as their publicly funded peers .  This accreditation process is often much more severe for 
private universities, due to ingrained establishment opposition to non-state institutions  
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The federal government also does not support research in private universities .  In fact, 
private universities compete for budget-subsidized student positions from the state, wher
these places are much more secure for public universities.  Despite the ability to charge 
tuition, the state subsidy for a free student position is actually significantly higher than an 
equivalent tuition amount, which means that state-supported students paradoxically subsidize 
a university's tuition-paying students instead of the other way around .  This is exacerb
by the fact that private Russian universities do not have endowments like their Western
counterparts .  Despite the similarities and overlapping interests of state and private 
universities, there are several key ways in which they differ from established state institutions. 
 Private universities are criticized more strongly than non-private universities, howev
they show more flexible and adaptable tendencies than those in the public sector.  A major 
way that private higher educational institutions do differ from their state-run peers is that th
suffer from a social stigma of not being as venerable as state universities108. In fact, media 
coverage consistently emphasizes the superiority of state degrees, and despite any additi
accreditation, private universities are always depicted as inferior109.  The best and most 
talented students always strive to enter a prestigious state university; the worst are alway
perceived to enroll in private universities110.  This generally negative opinion of private 
universities is not helped by periodic of professional misconduct and the lack of educational 
standards in private universities111.  One important aspect of private universities is that they
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are being created by private interests in order to meet the challenges posed by the existing 
higher education system112.  Problems such as producing unqualified graduates have been 
attributed to dysfunctional institutional legacies, which should be addressed by creating new 
and unburdened universities113, which may have more resources than their state-run peers114
This trend may actually lead to the production of more influential and successful grad
who could then effectively compete with public-university students, leading to some 
incremental competition among higher education institutions as a whole
.  
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115.  In fact, th
negative reputation of private universities may not be justifie
institutions can provide better instruction in some cases116.   
 Overall, however, despite their diversification of the educational environment, private 
universities' role may not make a substantial difference in overall reform efforts.  The ability 
of private higher educational institutions to reform the overall educational environment is
serious doubt.  First of all, the institutional environment is highly unfavorable to private
universities.  This is reflected in institutional policies that rigidly enforce employment 
requirements for academic professionals that only allow for large-scale private universit
function117.  Authorities also do not have much tolerance for an outside type of private 
educator, since they often look on business professionals and non-academics with great 
suspicion when considering accreditation issues118.  Unfortunately, private higher educati
seems to be just as corrupt as state-run institutions119, often using identical techniq
bribery and rent seeking120.  For some Russian students, once education has been 
characterized by a financial transaction, education is seen as more of a corrupt, commerc
exchange than a learning environment121.  These unfortunate trends serve to prevent the 
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realization of many potential benefits that private institutions might have provided because of 
their position outside of corrupt legacies.  Finally, since the state is still the primary arbiter of 
educational standards and accreditation, private universities are approved based on how much 
they conform to state-run universities' policies122.  This potentially stifles the developm
private institutions and ensu
ent of 
res that the primary actor in both state and private higher 
education in the same123.   
  3.3.) Primary Features of Russian Higher Education 
 Higher education is highly valued in the Russian Federation.  93.5% Russian students
see higher education as either important or extremely important .  According to surveys o
recent students, there are many reasons to obtain a degree, but there is convergence in two 
areas - employment and prestige.  At the moment, the prestige of higher education in Ru
extremely high .  Russian students overwhelmingly believe that higher education will 
increase their social status, and they hope that it will increase their future earnings .  So
Russian students see higher education as a means of getting a desirable job and of being 
professionally successful, not necessarily achieving high earnings .  Regardless of their 
individual definition of success, the idea of being successful is key to a Russian student's 
identity .  Since students are required to choose their major at the very beginning of their 
tertiary education, there is no real room for exploring other interests at a university, and the
are certainly no officially "undeclared" undergraduates at most Russian universities.  This 
particular social environment that surrounds the choice to pursue advanced education ha
several interesting implication
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s for both human capital and the value of Russian higher 
education in general. 
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 Standard human capital theory's rationalization of time investment does not apply to 
Russian students, and it should not be considered in the overall analysis of higher education's 
influence on Russian human capital.  The standard conception of human capital development 
is the ultimate value of time invested in education for the purpose of increasing future wages, 
versus potential wages lost from unrealized work opportunities during this time.  This kind of 
logic seems entirely rational, but it falls victim to many assumptions that do not apply in the 
Russian educational environment.  Even though many Russians are primarily oriented 
towards material well-being and look to education to increase their future wages, the primary 
reason that Russians enter a university is for social status and social advancement129, which 
cannot be properly quantified with the traditional model.  Even a consideration of social status 
as the accumulation of economically valuable social capital in the form of prestige does not 
fit, because Russian social status cannot be directly translated into conventional definitions of 
social capital.  Despite the similarity to social capital of Russian notions of blat and svyaz130, 
their competitive and exclusive nature prevents their consideration as social capital.  Aside 
from the inapplicability of economic analyses, there are other conceptual barriers to the 
blanket application of classic human capital investment theory.  In fact, the primary reasons 
that many Russians seek a doctoral dissertation are as a way to distinguish oneself via 
academic prestige131 and to better qualify oneself in an uncertain labor market132.  In this 
same direction, the primary reasons that Russians choose a profession are not related to 
market factors, but personal preferences and social considerations133. 
 Furthermore, it is not entirely clear who the source of a decision to pursue higher 
education is.  Russian students are not the primary actor in determining their academic future, 
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and thereby cannot be considered to be the source of a rational decision in investing in their 
own human capital.  For most Russian students, teachers and parents play a decisive role in 
determining majors and higher educational institutions134 135 or to attend a university 
altogether136.  Parents can determine the institution that their children attend via both direct 
pressure and control of finances used for support while studying137.  This kind of behavior 
can be explained by the view that some families have of higher education as a long-term 
family investment138 and a ticket to middle class status139.  Many Russian families, desp
not meeting the standard, time-dependent definition of human capital investment, still inv
based on other market considerations.  The investment required in tutors and other preparation 
to earn a free spot is often equal to or greater than the cost of a college education itself
ite 
est 
es147.  
140.  
Unfortunately, tutors often take on the role a broker of corrupt access, which is seen to 
disadvantage many poorer students that cannot afford to engage in indirect bribery141.  
Although many students work almost full time in order to fund their education independent of 
their parents142, a very large proportion of Russian students cannot make decisions about their 
professional development independently or reliably. 
 The lack of clear information and a predictable labor market also preclude any rational 
decision making by Russian students seeking higher education.  A degree is considered 
essential to getting any job in Russia143 144, but Russian students often do not have an 
accurate conception of the modern labor market, nor do they apparently choose professions 
based on wages alone145.  If they did make earnings-based career decisions, it is not 
represented in their choices of higher education146.  Russian students still choose educational 
specialties that will certainly have no positive impact on their later ability to earn wag
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Low paying occupations such as engineer, professor, engineer, and researcher, continu
attract thousands of candidates every year.  However the academic specialties required to 
work in these fields remain the least popular
e to 
sor, 
ussian 
148.  The goal of becoming a teacher or profes
for example, apparently cannot fulfill the professional ambitions of many of the students 
enrolled in such programs.  Despite the overall shortage of qualified professors in the R
Federation149 and the looming crisis of educators once the current generation begins to retire 
in seven to ten years150, neither increased wages nor competitive hiring practices are 
anywhere to be found.  Majors such as history, literature, engineering and science rarely 
produce high salaries, nor do they grant access to desirable professions.  More lucrative 
specialties are much more attractive to ambitious students. 
 Student choices of major and their preferred training are not dependent on a realistic 
image of the labor market.  The most popular majors have been "economist," "lawyer" and 
"consultant"151.  Despite the seemingly attractive nature of these choices, Russian universities 
do not produce attractive labor market candidates.  The position most in demand is a 
"manager," which is not satisfactorily produced by the existing higher education system.  This 
condition exacerbates a leadership talent shortage in most Russian firms152.  This problem is 
exacerbated by the way that universities orient their programs towards the labor market, 
relying equally on speculation and inflated, temporary demand153.  Some students realized 
their poor choice of major and completely disregard their first degrees in order to get a 
different bachelor's degree154.  Other students simultaneously enroll in two faculties at once in 
order to maximize their appeal to employers in the labor market, but not necessarily to 
maximize wages155.  Unfortunately, many Russian students suffer from a lack of accurate 
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information about the labor market that causes them to acquire unmarketable skills and forces 
companies to use their own training to make up the discrepancy156.  Even with enhanced 
training, the labor market remains very difficult to understand for many graduates. 
 The Russian labor market's particular selection and performance criteria do not allow 
for rational actors and rational criteria to incentivize higher education decisions.  First of all, 
one must remember that the Russian labor market does not exist in a truly free market 
economy.  Companies can regularly use unbalancing policies to gain temporary advantages, 
and firm performance may not be predominantly based on competitive factors157.  
Furthermore, firms rarely recruit unknown students based on qualifications alone.  Many 
graduating students rely entirely on informal contacts and non-market factors to find a job158.  
Unfortunately, many students do not understand what qualities are valued by the labor market, 
and they rarely identify with the qualities that are in highest demand159.  The one area in 
which the expectations of students and the labor market converge is in the value of having a 
degree160, which is seen as an essential validation of a candidate's abilities.  Despite this 
caveat, the overall confusion of perceptions is exacerbated by the corruption in Russian 
society. 
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4.) CORRUPTION DEFINITION AND CAUSALITY 
 Corruption is an unfortunate and persistent problem that has been historically endemic 
to many societies.  Partial treatment and the supremacy of personal interest over public 
interest is nothing new.  This problem, although stubbornly present in many modern societies, 
often defies conventional understanding and study.  In fact, the body of literature on 
corruption is mostly relatively recent and nuanced.  Globalization has brought traditional 
centers of developed institutional power into regular contact with emerging economies and 
traditional systems of social organization.  This kind of contact has made the question of 
corruption more important than ever, especially as commercial organizations from one 
cultural background try to participate in different institutional and social environments.  What 
may seem corrupt in one environment is seen as perfectly acceptable in another. 
 4.1.) Standard Definitions 
 For the purposes of this paper, the definition of corruption will be created by 
examining existing literature and the unique directions of this study. First of all, the hidden 
and intangible nature of corruption creates problems in making any definition161.  In another 
regard, the potential scope of corruption involves such a diverse mass of events that no single 
definition is sufficient to encapsulate them all.  For example, Gavrilov and Shevchenko 
defined corruption as the abuse of power by someone who monopolized authority in some 
way162.  This definition would appear to be supported by Rasma Karklins' contention that a 
communist political monopoly and the subsequent state economic monopoly inevitably led to 
corruption163.  Another conceptualization is that corruption is basically a monopoly combined 
with arbitrariness minus responsibility164.  These definitions are useful in some specific 
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contexts, but they do not capture the entirety of the problem.  For example, lower-level 
bureaucrats do not necessarily monopolize decision-making or reviewing powers due to 
overlapping jurisdictions and interference from superiors.  In fact, in the Russian system of 
vertically-corrupt hierarchies, this kind of approach to defining corruption is sometimes 
appropriate165.  Another view is that corruption is fundamentally an abuse of the allocation of 
scarce resources166.  In this sense, the totality of Karklins' definition is avoided, but it still 
relies on scarcity of necessary resources.  Ambitious corruptors may simply seek preferential 
treatment in an otherwise equal marketplace via corruption, which would not fall into this 
definition.  In many environments, scarcity in its myriad forms does in fact foster corruption, 
but it isn't necessary for corruption to be present. 
 Another possible definition of corruption relates to extortion.  For some interpretations 
of corruption literature, the main feature of corruption is the control of a necessary service, 
which is then abused for payment167.  This definition certainly applies to some cases of 
corruption, but not to all.  In fact, this is better defined as rent-seeking behavior, or extortion. 
In other words, this type of corruption only depicts active, predatory action on the part of an 
authority, but does not include susceptibility or a willingness to engage in corrupting activities 
by non-authorities.  A regular complaint of the Russian business environment, for example, is 
the unbalancing and dangerous advantages enjoyed by businesses that are able to influence or 
compromise governmental agencies in order to protect or expand their market share, which is 
not necessarily extortion.  This business-led approach is reflected in another Osipian 
definition of higher education corruption as "a system of informal relations established to 
regulate unsanctioned access to material and nonmaterial assets through abuse of the office of 
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public or corporate trust"168 169.  This definition includes both sides of a corrupt transaction, 
but it implies a systemic character that may not be present in many instances of corruption.   
 It is essential to include the individual character of corruption in any definition.  This 
is captured in two similar definitions, being "the abuse of authority for material gain" and "the 
exchange of wealth for power, where power is rooted in a public position"170.  These both fall 
prey to the assumption of predetermined means of compensation.  In fact, many corrupt 
transactions and abuses of office take place for no specific material reward, instead relying on 
accumulating influence or non-material favors.  In fact, a major form of corrupt exchange in a 
thoroughly corrupt society is in diversifying and expanding one's influence - an exchange of 
power for power.  The most popular definition that is encountered across the corruption 
literature is partially applicable in this regard.  As concisely stated by Karklins, corruption is 
identified as "the misuse of public power for private gain" 171 172.  This definition is quite 
applicable to higher education and to most kinds of corruption found in the former Soviet 
Union.  However, not only does it fall prey to the difficulties of above-mentioned Osipian 
definition, it also presumes private, individual gain.  The Soviet Union's collapse often led to 
severe material and financial shortages within the higher education system173 174 175.  In this 
unique environment, the goal of corruption is not automatically to line the pockets of corrupt 
officials, but to support the institutional needs of many institutions.  Economic inequalities 
and other structural pressures, including salaries that have no relation to the market value of 
life in a major Russian city, can create great incentives for corrupt behavior, but not 
necessarily for private gain.  In another sense, the abuse of authority in a private firm can also 
be considered corrupt, including engaging in demand side corruption, abusing market position 
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or providing misleading information for private gain.  These acts, however, are not included 
in an exclusively public focus. 
 4.2.) Specific Definition for My Paper 
 For the purposes of this paper, corruption will be examined in terms of its 
implications.  Corruption shall be defined as any voluntary behavior, including the abuse of 
trust or authority that harms or trivializes the legitimacy and effectiveness of an otherwise 
impartial institution or organization.  Since the fundamental role of any social institution is to 
function impartially for any citizens that use or depend on its services, the reliability of such 
an institution is paramount.  The key aspect of corruption is that it undermines the credibility 
of such institutions to the degree that their dysfunction harms those that do not have the 
ability to influence it dishonestly.  Therefore, all actions that deviate from an institution's 
purpose or affect its ability to reliably produce impartial results are to be defined as corrupt. 
 The scope of this definition can pose some complications, but they are necessary in 
order to fully understand the act of corruption in any institutional or social context.  Firstly, 
the reason for this focus on institutional implications is that both corruptors and the corrupted 
must be included in any examination of the topic.  In higher education, students are also 
representatives of the institution later in life.  Should they abuse a public resource, (a 
university), for their own gain (cheating to receive an unearned diploma), then this action is 
functionally and ethically equivalent to simply giving a series of bribes for the same result.  
The absence of a complicit authority does not mean that corruption has not taken place, 
especially since the appearance of an undeserving degree recipient raises the suspicion of 
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corruption.  The value of this kind of definition will become clearer as the idea of higher 
educational corruption is examined in greater detail. 
 There are several difficulties with this definition that should be addressed before using 
it as a base for serious academic endeavor.  By assigning responsibility to those without 
power, the victims of corrupt acts may potentially be blamed for their situation.  For example, 
someone who is forced to pay a bribe to a doctor in order to get necessary treatment is 
decidedly a victim, not an initiator.  This is precisely why corruption must be examined as a 
voluntary action, as specified in the definition.  When absolute coercion occurs, the initiator 
carries the overwhelming burden of the blame, as she would be the only voluntary party.  An 
example of this definition in action is getting a driver's license in Russia.  For some, an honest 
method of passing a driver's test is a very predictable way to get a driver's license.  For others, 
it is nearly impossible to get a license without giving gifts to the examiner - a kind of soft 
bribe.  For those who can't be bothered with finding an honest means to get a license and 
choose to simply offer a bribe, the blame for corruption would also lie with the non-authority.  
And for those stuck with a dishonest inspector, having no means to otherwise get their license, 
the responsibility for the corrupt act would lie with the licensing authority.  This meticulous 
approach is necessary to understand the intricate types of corruption found in modern Russian 
society. 
 4.3.) Sources of Corruption 
  4.3.1.) Systemic / Institutional 
 Institutional and systemic pressures are major source of corruption in the higher 
educational system of the Russian Federation.  The economic crisis of the early 1990s sent 
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shockwaves throughout key institutional pillars of the emerging state.  Spending on education 
dropped from 9.6% of GDP in 1986 to 2.9% in 2000176, and Russian education spending as a 
percentage of GDP is still lower than many developed nations177.  Long periods passed where 
civil servants were not paid and budgets were not provided, which was crippling for a sector 
of the economy that is so state dependent.  In this difficult environment, corruption is seen as 
a possible way of meeting institutional demands without relying on an incapable state 
patron178.  This kind of corruption can be caused in two ways.  One way is when the 
institution itself organizes and promotes systemic corrupt behavior, so as to meet its basic 
requirements.  An example of this would be where a university's rector organizes a system 
that ensures the corrupt selection of students and the withholding of key services so that 
budgets could be met.  This kind of situation is quite optimistic, assuming that a 
comprehensively corrupt institution behaves collectively and only out of the need for its own 
survival.  However, the more common form of this type of corruption is realized on an 
individual level. 
 The individual level of this corruption model is easily seen in the uncoordinated acts 
of extortion that have characterized the 1990s through to the current day.  According to a 
recent survey, the average instructor is the main breadwinner for his or her family, has worked 
for in the field for an average of 23 years and rates the material condition of their families as 
average179.  Unfortunately, educators at state institutions have notoriously low wages180, an 
average of 6,000 RUR per month181.  In a stark comparison, this pay is less than that of bus 
divers and subway engineers182.  This amount of pay in no way can provide for the essentials 
of daily life in most regions of Russia, to say nothing of the high cost of living in a capital city 
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like Moscow.  This financial pressure forces many professors at Russia's most prestigious 
universities to take on extra jobs at multiple institutions and to augment such a demanding 
schedule with additional private tutoring in off-hours. 
 Due to the unfortunately low pay of even this taxing work regimen, professors are 
often left without enough money to live.  Therefore, corruption is seen as the only way out to 
meet basic financial needs183. This unfortunate condition is key for explaining the current 
professor shortage in Russia, and why the nation may very likely run out of professors in ten 
or fifteen years184.  From a more esoteric perspective, low relative pay and prestige could 
harm educational professionals' psychological well-being and reduce their ability to function 
morally185.  The attractiveness of bribery in this environment is readily apparent, since the 
level of expected bribes can exceed official pay by three or four times186. 
 In another sense, systematic pressures can be realized in simple institutional resource 
inadequacy.  For example, dissertation review boards are so understaffed that they cannot 
realistically review the number of dissertations that are submitted every year, which makes 
corruption a potential necessity to grant otherwise essential services187.  Therefore, 
professionals could be hopelessly unequipped to deal with their personal or professional 
responsibilities, which incentivizes rule-breaking. 
 The systemic pressure model is the most popular explanation for current levels of 
corruption in the Russian Federation.  With the chaotic and crippling 1990s still weighing 
strongly in recent memory, many experts immediately look to financial and institutional 
pressures as the primary factors in determining corrupt behavior in all aspects of Russian 
public life188.  Furthermore, the systemic pressure model plays a very diplomatic role in 
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determining the sources of Russian corruption by alleviating the blame of any one individual.  
Be it the state budget, incompetent state ministers or simple uncertainty in the future, 
education professionals are characterized by themselves and other observers as victims of a 
system beyond their control189 190.  In fact, in higher education, many observers tend to see 
corruption as 'forced' onto students and educators191.  This kind of perception may not 
necessarily be accurate. Unfortunately, in light of recent budget policies and major increases 
to teacher pay, coupled with the extravagant lifestyles of some educators, the systemic 
pressure model alone is not sufficient to analyze the question of corruption in Russian higher 
education.  
 Many academic professionals do not engage in corruption for purely survival reasons.  
In many cases, academic professionals rely on opportunism to engage in corrupt behavior192.  
In fact, many institutional structures that were designed to generate additional income for 
universities were put into place once restrictions were lifted, but before the major economic 
chaos of the 1990s193.  It is a common practice of corrupt institutions to automatically blame 
systemic pressures and a lack of finance to justify ongoing corrupt behavior, even when this is 
far from the truth194.  This is demonstrated by observations of how increasing salaries do not 
necessarily reduce corruption once corrupt behavior has been normalized195. 
 Another important factor in the overall consideration of systemic corruption is the 
level of adaptation by key actors.  The economic shocks of the 1990s took place long ago, and 
most professors have long since adapted.  It is important to remember that Russian education 
is not populated by "average" professors, but by a large stratification of different types of 
educators196.  This kind of stratification creates some classes of professors and educational 
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professionals that are above the standard systemic pressures of the Russian university system 
due to their prestige and income197.  Professors often have multiple avenues of supplemental 
income that allow them to live, including multiple jobs198, tutoring199 and non-academic work 
as well200.  However, there could also be a simple desire to engage in corrupt activity for 
something other than essential material needs - which may be reflected in the trend of 
growing corruption in the Russian Federation despite easing of systemic pressures. 
 Recent government policies have substantially reduced the overall systemic pressure 
placed on Russian higher educational institutions.  Whereas academic funding did not 
significantly increase for ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union201, the Russian 
Federation's higher education budget increased dramatically in the last few years, more than 
eclipsing pre-crisis levels.  In fact, the budget for higher education has increased by 400% 
from 2000-2006202.  In some cases, instructors’ salaries have been increased to a very 
respectable 30,000 RUR per month203.  State subsidies per student in free positions has 
increased from 18,000 RUR per year to 51,600 RUR204, which greatly alleviates budget 
shortages even though the estimated cost of educating a student now stands at 74,400RUR.  
Even though some financial shortages remain, they are a fraction of what they once were.  
This means that the level of corruption involved should be responding to higher funding by 
decreasing, not increasing.  Unfortunately, higher education corruption has been a booming 
business. The overall level of corruption in higher education has increasing rapidly every 
year, which will be addressed in the next section.  Therefore, systemic pressures alone are not 
sufficient to explain this issue.  In an even more telling example, the Russian government has 
decided to cease its continual increases in higher education funding in favor of investing in 
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primary and secondary education, since it has been perceived that systemic weaknesses have 
been adequately addressed205. 
 In terms of the timeline of corruption and reduced state capability, the emergence of 
this problem is very telling.  Soviet higher educational institutions independently sought their 
own autonomy from the state before the chaotic 1990s206, thereby independently limiting state 
influence and support before the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Furthermore, the modern trend 
of dissertation corruption in Russia apparently began in Moscow during the 1990s, despite the 
fact that this region suffered the least from financial hardships207.  This trend of regional 
preference in corruption continues today, further undermining the systemic pressure model.  
Higher education corruption is the highest in Saint Petersburg and Moscow208, where 
universities are the best funded and professors are better compensated than anywhere else in 
the Russian Federation.  In another example, Taganrog State University has recently 
improved its status and reduced corruption with cadre changes and leadership renewal, despite 
ongoing and severe systemic pressures209.  Therefore, increasing tendencies in corruption in 
higher education must be caused by some additional factor in addition to partial budgetary 
insufficiency. 
  4.3.2.) Historical 
 Corruption is an inheritable behavior that can be transmitted via conditioning and 
socialization, as seen in the way that Russia's recent history influenced the current state of 
corruption in its system of higher education.  In fact, it could be argued that the primary 
reason for the longevity of corruption as a fixture of Russian public life is that it is a value that 
is handed down from one generation to the next, despite systemic changes.  Corruption is far 
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from a recent innovation in Russia.  Despite a much higher level of prestige for Soviet 
universities and academies than their modern counterparts, corruption was a key part of 
student life and the admissions process, but in a much less flagrant way210.  This was 
compounded by the essential role of higher education in serving the needs of the "communist 
establishment"211 rather than serving as a center of advancing knowledge.  All institutions in 
the Soviet Union were touched by corruption to a certain degree, including periods of rule by 
both Stalin212 and Khruschev213.  Departing far from the original concept of a functional, 
classless, unbiased state, the economy and all parts of civil life became independent sources 
of power and privilege for those that could control them.  Key decisions were made in 
consideration of blat (hidden political and economic influence) than of the public good. 
 For many in the Soviet Union, corruption was the only means available to meet one's 
needs independent of the state.  First of all, the state's structure became more and more rigid, 
which produced a greater and greater need for individuals and organizations to improvise so 
as to meet their basic needs.  In fact, many official functions became reduced to mere ritual.  
Even anti-corruption campaigns and policies gradually came to be regarded with extreme 
cynicism214, and any large-scale anti-corruption activity met serious political opposition215.  
A regularly quoted Soviet joke perfectly captures this point - "we pretend to work and the 
state pretends to pay us."  This ubiquitous state inadequacy led to greater and greater feeling
of resentment and cynicism towards official power, even as corruption became an inextricabl
part of Soviet daily life
s 
e 
216.  The state gradually became a massive, abusive and incompetent 
patron to its citizen clients. 
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 Towards the end of the Soviet Union, resisting state legitimacy and subverting state 
power became key parts of everyday life and mass culture.  The Soviet economy functioned 
only thanks to a system of illegal barter between supposedly independent industries.  
Furthermore, widespread police and customs corruption allowed for the widespread, and very 
illegal, shadow economy to function217.  For some in Russia, this kind of black market was 
desirable and essential.  Ubiquitous perceptions of elite corruption led to routine instances of 
state defiance that, despite their corrupt nature, were not seen as corrupt by the low-level 
actors who committed them218.  The state was no longer any kind of provider or protector, but 
a doddering, lumbering enemy that deserved to be manipulated and exploited at every 
opportunity219.  Another popular saying of the Soviet period reflects this mentality: "If you 
don't steal from the government, then you are stealing from your family."  This anti-state 
mentality exacerbated the ongoing problems of state effectiveness throughout the 1990s. 
 The 1990s created widespread structural problems for the modern Russian educational 
system, and it also fundamentally changed the professional and institutional culture that 
controlled them.  The loss of state control at the center removed many barriers and policing 
mechanisms that would otherwise have de-incentivized corrupt practices220.  Suddenly losing 
the ability to function on a professional level and to support oneself on a survival level created 
financial desperation221.  This impossible situation caused a "breaking of psychological 
barriers"222 that forever changed the priorities of educators and administrators.  Corruption 
was at first an improvised, detestable and necessary means of temporary support, but it 
became a standard way to earn money in the field of higher education, which gradually grew 
in sophistication223.  Authorities in this area adapted to the consistent level of illegitimate 
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income that corruption provided, and they came to gradually embrace it as a means of 
realizing their own desires, and those of their colleagues. 
 Higher educational institutions and hierarchies gradually transformed into agencies 
that specifically controlled and manipulated access to resources for the purposes of amassing 
bribe money.  Administrators would advance the careers of those that would "play ball" and 
productively participate in the overall corrupt scheme224.  In fact, some organizations became 
so adapted to corruption, that widespread systems of organized, hierarchical and vertical 
corrupt activity would come to dominate the institution itself225.  Professors and 
administrators would be expected to engage in this activity so as to benefit their superiors' 
demands for illegitimate income.  All services, from dormitories to grading to diploma 
awarding became dominated by corrupt expectations and bribery in some cases226.  As 
described by some experts on the topic, bribery in education became merely "an open social 
secret"227.  This type of exploitation became so widespread that it has been accepted by some 
students as an unfortunate, but entirely normal additional cost of attending a university.  This 
behavior on the part of those who bribe is also indicative of a significant perception of 
corruption. 
  4.3.3.) Perceptions 
 Recent Russian history and historical legacies of the Soviet Union have directly led to 
an ongoing cultural perception of corruption that has conditioned citizens to expect and 
participate in corruption on a regular basis.  This phenomenon is essential to include, since 
"corruption is not only a problem of governing, but also a daily expectation among the mass 
publics."228  Expanding on the role of institutions in shaping behavior as noted in the 
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Michigan Law example, the shaping role of a society composed of corrupt institutions is even 
more telling.  Citizens regularly participate in what is defined as "petty corruption," which 
occurs at a low level of society and has fewer broader institutional or social implications229.  
Participation in this type of corruption is often rationalized by ubiquitously perceived 
corruption among the higher levels of the government, which citizens see as a means to both 
excuse their behavior and to rationalize it as a means of advancing oneself230.  To this end, 
perceptions of corruption, no matter how accurate they may be, play a decisive role in 
influencing the corrupt behavior of lower level actors.  This conclusion becomes significant, 
because it is often hard to determine whether a corrupt actor behaves in such a way due to 
personal material ambition and abuse of office or due to the irresistible pressure of constant 
bribe offers.  The media, as a primary source of information and perception formation about 
corruption231, must be examined in any given country to evaluate the role perceptions of 
corruption play. 
 The Russian media is completely saturated with depictions of corruption, supporting 
the perception that illegitimate activity is the rule rather than an exception.  The media is 
constantly presenting newer and more shocking stories of corruption and its high price on 
society.  Corruption in higher education is often covered by the media232.  The standard story 
is a scathing expose of low-level bureaucratic corruption, which leaves many of the higher 
officials unmentioned233 and allows for corruption to persist from the top234.  This approach, 
despite playing into the Western narrative that the Russian media is fully compromised or 
controlled by the state in order to legitimize the current regime, is not valid.  Any episode of 
"Код доступа," regularly aired on the Gazprom-owned Эхо Москвы radio station is full of 
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the most scathing accusations of corruption of even the highest level officials.  Regular 
descriptions of how national authorities are either powerless or complicit in corrupt acts 
reinforce the idea that illegitimate activity is to be expected and suspected at every turn235. 
Corruption has even become a regular part of popular humor, as demonstrated by some of the 
most popular shows on major Russian networks.  One television show, "Наша Раша," (Our 
Russia) features the recurring character of a provincial traffic cop, who is regularly shaken 
down by his fur-coat wearing, chauffeur-driven MVD superior.  His commander would 
reproach the hapless officer for not collecting enough in bribes, while suggesting that he 
follow the example of a prostitute standing next to him, who is able to kick up far more 
money to her corrupt patron.  To what degree this two-sided example of corrupt activity is 
considered the responsibility of corrupt authority or the willing criminal is a matter for 
consideration. 
 4.4.) Two-Sided Corruption 
 Two-sided corruption is an important addition to the discussion on corruption 
literature by including both parties that are not officially responsible and activity that is not 
officially criminal activity.  One of the most important characteristics of the corrupt Russian 
higher educational system is that corruption is two-sided.  As Karklins points out, in a corrupt 
system average people can be both victims and accomplices, and corruption can come from 
both the state and private individuals236.  Both authorities and citizens engage in corrupt acts 
by either demanding or offering bribes for favorable treatment.  A major distinction here from 
the standard view of corruption is that no authority is necessary, nor is anything more than 
nominal association with an institution required in order to be involved in a corrupt act.  The 
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abuse of an institution from a position of authority and a position of dependence are both 
possible, and those who would gain from an institution in an illegitimate (albeit subservient) 
way are also considered to be corrupt for the purposes of this paper.  The willing bribe taker 
and the voluntary bribe giver are equally corrupt.  In terms of higher education, a student can 
be just as corrupt as a professor, with the same potential result.  If such corrupt acts were 
committed on a large scale by all possible dependent actors, then the effects would be 
significant and worthy of overall consideration.  Whereas an abuse of authority is considered 
criminal, a group of students that engage in coordinated cheating are not committing criminal 
behavior, despite the fact that action could be considered corrupt.  The two functions of a 
higher educational institution in human capital development and its overall institutional 
validity for the temporary personal gain of the corrupting actor, regardless of their position of 
authority.  Furthermore, an important distinguishing feature of corruption is that it is not 
always an illegal act. 
 Non-criminal and unregulated activities must be included in the overall discussion of 
corruption, since they can have terrible effects on the overall value of an institution and the 
society that it serves.  Actions that fall outside the realm of clearly illegal activity, such as 
deliberately losing important paperwork, turning the other way when someone cheats on a 
licensing exam, or not answering the phone at an emergency service due to extended smoking 
breaks, still do significant harm to the effectiveness of an institution and must be included in 
the overall definition of corruption.  It is true that gross incompetence in positions of authority 
that lead to death or personal harm is considered illegal.  However, the ability of interested 
parties to regulate corrupt or incompetent behavior with policing is far from fully effective237.  
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In this context, subordinates take advantage of an institutional weakness for their own ends 
and to the detriment of another dependent individual.  In general, the realm of criminal statues 
about corruption is by no means comprehensive enough to include the majority of damaging 
activity.  For example, favoritism is very difficult to prove, except in egregious cases, as are 
any biases.  Some corrupt acts may not have any real measurable reward.  Should a police 
officer look the other way when he witnesses an old friend commit a petty crime - emotional 
rewards and sentimentality cannot be measured or reliably proven.  This kind of activity is 
important in an overall examination of the various kinds of corruption that plague the Russian 
higher education system.  
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5.) HIGHER EDUCATION CORRUPTION 
 5.1.) Introduction - What kinds of actions in Russian Higher Education are 
 Corrupt? 
 Russian higher education suffers from massive levels of corruption.  According to a 
2008 poll, anywhere from 11-19% of Russian families have admitted to bribing educational 
institutions for either admissions or grades238.  Another 2008 estimate asserted that higher 
education corruption was costing the Russian government more than one billion dollars per 
year239, and the annual amount of bribes that occurs in universities is now estimated to be 
anywhere from $540 million to $1.5 billion240.  This kind of corruption involves hundreds of 
thousands of people241.  Even formerly sacrosanct areas such as doctoral education have been 
affected and are widely perceived to be corrupt242.  Measured levels of higher education 
corruption in the Russian Federation from 2001-2005 demonstrate that this is a "systemic" 
problem, reaching nearly 60% of students in some cases243.  In 2002, it was estimated that a 
majority of Russian students graduate with the aid of corrupt methods244.  This trend led 
education to be recognized as the most corrupt sector of Russian society in 2004245 and 
2005246.  Unfortunately, according to UNESCO, bribery in Russian higher educational 
institutions have discredited them so much that they are practically being "destroyed" as 
effective social institutions247.  This unfortunate situation of high corruption in a crucial social 
institution has several serious consequences.  These include a reduction in institutional 
confidence, a denial of the essential services of higher education, a reduction in human capital 
and an overall socialization of corruption throughout society248 249.  Inasmuch as the scale of 
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higher education corruption is a concern for its greater implications, it also demands a specific 
approach that examines its diverse mechanisms. 
 Corruption in Russian higher education is an intricate topic that encompasses many 
different types of corrupt acts250.  In order to satisfactorily examine this phenomenon's 
implications, they must be examined in terms of each specific kind of corruption that is 
present in the system.  For the purposes of this paper financial corruption, selection 
corruption, grading corruption, accreditation corruption and academic dishonesty will be 
examined.  Some scholars have divided these types of corruption into student-affecting and 
non-student-affecting251.  All corrupt acts in public view and close to an institution's 
dependents are significant in shaping perceptions; therefore any perceived corruption will be 
considered as having an effect on students for this thesis.  It should be noted that the 
mechanisms for specific corrupt exchanges will be mentioned as examples of corrupt 
behavior, but their implications will be examined entirely relative to the corruption's role in 
the academic process.  It also important to note that when analyzing systemic corruption, it is 
very difficult if not impossible to be precise, since the nature of corruption ensures that it is 
consistently hidden from any observer252 253.  In this situation, the only available evidence is 
anecdotal, which provides a telling, if imperfect picture of the greater phenomenon.  In order 
to best understand this varied world of ethically dubious activity, a step-by-step approach is 
necessary. 
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6.) FINANCIAL CORRUPTION 
 6.1.) Identification and Definition Adherence 
 Financial corruption involves an array of actions that are corrupt and often illegal.  
The traditional example of financial corruption is the abuse of financial resources for a 
purpose other than that of the institution, such as via embezzlement.  This is the most clearly 
corrupt act, since it is both illegal and undermining.  Furthermore, it meets the unique 
definition of corruption that has been chosen for this study, since it is both voluntary and 
harmful to the institution - in terms of financial deprivation and the subsequent undermining 
of its credibility among students and other public observers. 
 6.2.) Methods and Examples 
Financial corruption methods are as old as human society, and they include several 
specifically harmful techniques.  This practice is found in many countries and includes 
approaches that both divert state support for the university and manipulate the private 
sector254.  First of all, the chronic issue of embezzlement demands attention.  State funds, 
occasionally regarded as nothing more than a potential source of personal enrichment for 
those with access in Russian and Soviet society, still fall prey to regular plunder by 
officials255.  A recent investigation by the MVD, "Образование - 2009," revealed several 
large-scale instances of embezzlement by city and regional education officials across 
Russia256.  Other common techniques of this kind of corruption include inflating orders, 
changing invoices, overpaying and issuing kickbacks, all which are used in countries around 
the world257. 
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Since the state is the major actor in Russian higher education, providing major 
financial support for every “free” student spot, the opportunity to divert state funds is 
omnipresent.  In the educational system, this is done in a simple way.  Some universities 
falsely over- report the number of free students enrolled so as to receive more funding258.  
Someone with access to budgetary authority redirects funds from one department to another 
account, access to which is only available for the corrupt administrator.  Other methods 
include redirecting funds not directly to the administrator, but via the university itself.  
Examples of this kind of financial abuse abound, such as rector’s offices that are equipped 
with private luxury bedrooms and lavish saunas259, despite the university's crumbling 
facilities.  The sale or misappropriation of university resources is a particularly nagging 
source of corruption in modern Russia.  Theoretically facing regular budget crises, some 
Russian universities have resorted to exploiting the most valuable resource that they own – 
property.  Often occupying some of the most desirable real estate in the most prosperous cities 
in Russia, many universities either rent out their facilities to private companies260 or sell them 
outright261.  Therefore, it is not completely uncommon to see banks, law firms or consulting 
offices operating inside universities themselves.   
The economic needs of a university provide a broad variety of ways to facilitate major 
financial corruption.  Heyneman describes this phenomenon as “procurement corruption,”262 
where a university uses large-scale orders of supplies, textbooks, equipment, etc. as a means 
of attracting corrupt income.  A third kind of corruption mechanism in this sector is to provide 
exclusive concession service rights to connected interests.  At one Moscow university, the 
rector’s son was given control of the student café, where he immediately increased prices to 
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ridiculous levels and reduced costs by absurd amounts – causing great outcry among 
students263.  Popular resistance was able to end this particular instance of corruption, but such 
outcry is rare.  In another case, at Nizhny Novgorod University, students are crowded into 
cramped, terrible dormitories, while the university administration builds luxury apartment 
blocks for the exclusive use of administrators264.  So long as the aggrieved party makes no 
complaint, because they themselves often may be complicit and profit from this act, then no 
attention is attracted from authorities.  In such a situation, without clear criminal 
investigations, the only reliable accounts are rumors.   
 6.3.) Implications 
  6.3.1.) Exacerbating Systemic Pressure 
 Financial corruption has many implications for Russian higher education, although 
they often do not directly affect students.  In terms of embezzlement or procurement 
corruption, the implications are clear.  Vital financial resources, often claimed to be already 
insufficient, are consumed by corrupt officials, which then exacerbates a tense situation.  
Financial corruption, although often not directly affecting students due to its administrative 
character, can exacerbate existing systemic pressures by creating unnecessary budget 
shortages and other stresses on underfunded departments, which already appear to be so 
severe that they harm the ability of Russia to grow economically265.  Therefore, if diverted 
funds directly and artificially inflate financial deprivation, then other forms of corruption that 
are affected by systemic pressure grow.  In this difficult environment, any systemic reform 
efforts are fundamentally limited, as well as the basic functioning of any institution, despite 
sufficiently addressing financial shortages.  Furthermore, this level of financial deprivation 
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harms students.  Since stipends are also publicly funded, their miserly level forces most 
students to take on major work obligations in order to support themselves266.  Regularly 
skipping months of classes and running out of time to complete any assignments, students are 
then highly incentivized to engage in corrupt behavior such as bribery and cheating in order to 
maintain their academic status.  In essence, financial corruption saps any institution’s 
effectiveness by compromising fundamental mechanisms, the well-being of its dependents 
and that of those that manage it. 
  6.3.2.) Corrupt Institutional Culture 
 Financial corruption leads to an institutional culture of corruption that further harms 
higher education.  Financial corruption in any of its forms requires several complicit 
individuals to succeed.  In this environment, individuals in positions of responsibility 
surround themselves with those that are willing to undertake corruption and protect their 
complicit superiors, thus forming a corrupt “krug.”  Corrupt “krugi,” or circles, are rife in the 
former Soviet Union, and are a primary mechanism for widespread, organized corruption267.   
Krugi also can function via the silence of one's peers about corrupt activity that they 
themselves are not participating in268.  By providing both the means for corrupt activity and 
mutual cover, krugi are remarkably effective, even more when one considers that bribes are 
not exchanged via krugi, but influence and favors269. Within an organization or across 
different societal sectors, many krugi overlap and can self-perpetuate, creating widespread 
corruption across entire regions or economic sectors270.  In this environment, and in a 
typically vertically hierarchal organization like a university, corruption can very easily 
become the determining factor in overall organizational structure and institutional culture271.  
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This kind of environment can do irreversible and destructive harm to an institution of higher 
education, transforming the entire institution from one of learning and human capital 
development to one of exploitation and theft.  In the case of being fully compromised, a 
corrupt higher educational institution can render serious harm to its students and to society in 
the form of deprivation of the necessary graduates who would otherwise be better able to 
contribute to society.  Furthermore, the students directly suffer from an indifferent 
organization that is no longer interested in its official duty so much as the perpetuation of 
dysfunctional policies and criminal enrichment. 
  6.3.3.) Socializing Corruption 
 Corrupt higher educational institutions present serious long-term implications for 
students and human capital in general.  Students that thrive in a corrupt higher educational 
environment have often successfully adapted to its unique requirements, corruption and all272.  
In this case, a corrupt university administrative structure could be shaping students to be 
actors in a future corrupt system and to expect corruption at every turn273 274.  Not simply 
turning students into cynical professionals, but into fully functional participants in a corrupt 
system is a serious distortion of the shaping role of a university.  In this situation, students’ 
soft skills could be profoundly warped.  Instead of developing diligence, patience and 
persuasion, they could be shaped to develop ways to either compromise a system that is seen 
as corrupt or to avoid and undermine it at every turn, very much as Soviet citizens that were 
shaped by the Soviet Union.  As mentioned earlier, views of ubiquitous corruption in the 
Soviet Union were used to justify individual acts of corruption.  It would be reckless to 
assume that the shaping role of a single corrupt institution in modern Russia could match that 
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of the entire corrupt institutional network of the Soviet Union.  However, the omnipresence of 
tangible corruption can hardly develop graduates that are better prepared to participate in and 
support a free society.  Furthermore, by looking at the Michigan law school example, it is 
certain that institutions and institutional culture can play a decisive role in the future behavior 
and perceptions of students.  Therefore, it is a very real risk that the behavior of a corrupt 
institution can distort the worldviews and behavior of those that depend on it.  Unfortunately, 
the problems facing the Russian Federation’s higher education system are not related solely to 
financial abuses by administrative organs.  
  6.3.4.) Safety and Physical Risks 
 Financial corruption can directly damage the value of a university and even risk the 
lives of Russian students.  Russian universities are plagued by outdated and useless equipment 
that prevents them from competing on an international level275.  Moreover, financial 
deprivation has allowed many higher educational institutions' facilities to decay to an unheard 
of degree276 277.  In fact, many dormitories/are considered unsafe to live in for students, due to 
problems with utilities and not meeting fire codes278.  This example was tragically 
demonstrated in a Moscow dormitory fire that led to the death of several students279 280.  
Furthermore, the unauthorized rental of school property can lead to terrible risks due to the 
carelessness of tenants and the ways that student welfare is disregarded281.  This kind of 
tangible physical risk to students is certainly unacceptable by any standard, yet systemic 
pressures of individual corrupt motivation can lead an organization to endure such risks for 
the purpose of profiting from corruption. 
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7.) SELECTION CORRUPTION 
 7.1.) Identification and Definition Adherence 
 Admissions and selection are major sources of corruption in Russian higher education, 
occupying arguably the highest position in terms of visibility and scale.  Selection corruption 
is the biased admission of unqualified students at the expense of better qualified applicants 
according to a university’s official standards due to dishonest interference from an influential 
member of the admissions committee or the university administration.  Selection corruption is 
significant in the sense that it can occur with or without bribery.  Via selection corruption, the 
overall effectiveness of a university is undermined, since honest efforts to enroll are 
trivialized, and views of the university as impartial are harmed.   
 7.2.) Methods and Examples 
 Selection corruption was a chronic problem in the Soviet Union282, and it persists 
today in many forms283.  Admission to the most promising universities in the Soviet Union 
was an expected privilege of the children of nomenklatura members and professors' 
children284.  The belief was so widespread that selection was possible for those that could 
bribe or influence corrupt officials that it took a systemic character.  According to the 
monopoly definition of corruption285, higher education was a profoundly fertile ground for 
corrupt selection286.  Valuable commodities in the Soviet Union that would produce tangible 
benefits, such as a prestigious education, were in a sharp deficit287.  And those that controlled 
access to it, like all gatekeepers in a monopoly, were prone to corruption.  Modern day 
selection corruption is no less ubiquitous, but much less formalized. 
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 The sophisticated mechanisms for selection corruption provide many ways of hiding 
the act itself.  Since selection corruption, like all aspects of corruption, is a fundamentally 
hidden phenomenon, it is essential for the perpetrators that reliable, indirect methods be 
developed in order to ensure consistency and stability in this act.  A classic example from 
recent Russian educational life is tutoring as a means of bribery.  Bribery can occur by 
privately hiring tutors for an aspiring student who happen to have the ability to influence 
admissions decisions288 289.  As many as one third of Russian students that graduate from high 
school use tutors in order to improve their chances of entering a university290.  Tutors may 
accept large payments, but never meet with their students, and then, for the most appropriate 
official reason, the student would be accepted291, given a minimally acceptable entrance exam 
performance.  Students that do not undertake such extracurricular persuasion are often seen to 
be at a distinct disadvantage in selection292.  Another mechanism for selection corruption is 
the support of existing corrupt krugi.  By using informal relations, one determines exactly 
what kind of bribe is necessary and how much to pay293.  Ensuring the admission of a 
valuable contact’s children to major educational institutions can pay huge future dividends for 
Ph.D-holding academics and their other contacts, who can expect other financial rewards at 
later dates.  It should also be noted that the most effective way of hiding major selection 
corruption was the complete control that a university had over its admissions, which allowed 
an overall corrupt hierarchy, as mentioned in the previous section, to engage in organized 
selection corruption.  Hiding the results of entrance exams, selective grading or other methods 
can be very simply organized among the limited membership of an admissions committee.  
The barrage of selection corruption that permeates the Russian higher educational system is 
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unique in its visibility and consistency, which has even led to the emergence of a stabilized 
market of selection corruption. 
 The remarkably high level of selection corruption as a mass, market-responsive 
phenomenon requires special attention in order to better understand its implications.  As 
mentioned above, selection corruption has been a fixture of the Russian and Soviet university 
systems and is widely perceived today294.  A 2007 survey showed that 98% of Saratov 
university students had heard of paying bribes to enter the university, and 56% say that 
bribery is widespread in Russia295.  Modern levels of selection corruption, however, have 
become real, tangible markets of corrupt access.  According to MVD research, admissions to 
the most desirable majors at the most prestigious institutions can be valued at tens of 
thousands of Euros296.  Admissions to business and law schools at MGU and SPbGU go for 
30,000-40,000 Euros297.  This could be explained by the high levels of demand for these 
majors298.  For general admissions, much less is required, and for regional universities, even 
less than one thousand dollars299.  This kind of corruption has begun to be traded openly300, 
even seeing the circulation of certain "price lists" for illegitimate admissions301. 
 The bribes-for-admissions phenomenon should also be understood in a uniquely 
Russian social paradox – bribes are given for “free” positions only.  Admission to students 
can be given officially for a specific tuition amount, as opposed to the traditional method, as 
reflected in a survey that showed students preferring the relative "ease" of enrolling and 
passing exams302.  Almost half of Russian students now attend classes on a tuition basis303.  
Despite this apparently legal form of paid entrance, the social stigma of publicly paying for an 
education is so great304 that most bribers prefer to pay for free positions.  Furthermore, both 
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tuition-paying and non-tuition-paying students are compelled to bribe at the same rate after 
entry305.  So, despite the official approval of paid admissions, the corruption market is 
thriving due to providing an apparently superior product in terms of prestige.  This type of
action, which goes so far as to supersede official methods to allow it, has particularly 
damaging consequences for Russian higher education, human capital and society in
 
 general. 
 The current state of the selection corruption market reveals a compelling fact - higher 
education corruption is perpetuated both by corrupt providers, but also by ambitious 
consumers.  Recent surveys and statistics have shown that as many as 80% of Russian parents 
are willing to engage in bribery in order to ensure their child's admission to a university306.  
This is a major increase from 2004, where it was estimated that only a maximum of 20% of 
families engaged in bribery or were ready to bribe307.  Today's families are not only willing to 
engage in corruption, but to do so at great sacrifice, spending as much as 30-40% of their 
income on bribes308.  This demonstrates that not only is there an opportunity to bribe one's 
way into a college, but also that there's competitive consumer demand for this kind of service.  
Although a majority of Russian students claim to have entered a university honestly309, 
widespread reports of selection corruption demonstrate that it has a significant presence in 
higher education overall.  The consequences of such a practice are significant. 
 7.3.) Implications 
  7.3.1.) Safety and Physical Risks 
Graduates who have benefited from corrupt selection can have directly harmful effects 
on Russian society.  By not only witnessing corruption and being incentivized to use it, 
directly profiting from corruption can lead to the further socialization of corrupt behavior to a 
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greater degree after graduation310.  The mass use of corruption as a means of personal 
advancement and leveraging influence have come to dominate the psychological development 
of many Russians, especially in how they decide to enter a university311.  Education not only 
benefits the economy, but also instills norms that reinforce social behavior in students, 
actively engaging in socialization312.  This trend of socializing corruption is represented in a 
recent opinion survey of Russian students in Saratov, where only 48% felt that bribery to 
enter a university was wrong313.  Selection methods have direct effects on the behavior and 
expectations of students.  Mentality changes in tuition-paying students can cause them to 
justify corruption and bribery, seeing traditionally free higher education as a simple financial 
transaction314.  This is reflected in the high number of students and parents who think that 
both unethical influence and bribery are acceptable in guaranteeing one’s spot in a 
university315, thus demonstrating that they are not merely the unwitting victims of rent-
seeking, but that they are actively using the corrupt system to benefit their own interests. 
This type of readily available selection corruption can easily lead to a perception that 
not only is corruption advantageous to the Russian elite, but also that it is a simple currency of 
social transactions.  Such perceptions have damaging effects, since once a student or parent 
has been given the ascriptive identity of being corrupt, they may continue to behave in such a 
way for years316.  Furthermore, corruption in practice by those that benefit from it can easily 
lead to further corrupt behavior and justification317.  What sets selection corruption apart from 
other types of unethical activity is the role that it provides for students and graduates. 
Unlike financial corruption, selection corruption conditions a student to engage in and 
rely on corruption as profiteers from such activity.  The key actor in this exchange is a 
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student's family, where the student would then receive the benefits.  Students almost 
completely depend on their parents during the application process318.  Students alone cannot 
provide the means for influencing admissions committees, since they possess neither the 
financial nor the social resources necessary.  In this sense, the high levels of parents openly 
admitting that they are willing to engage in bribery to get their children admitted becomes 
more understandable.  Sincerely wanting the best for their children, and sincerely believing 
that corruption is the only way for them to get a fair chance at social advancement are 
understandable in the modern context319.   
The role of parents in shaping their children’s impressions of the higher education 
system are interesting, since the expenses incurred for bribery are often beyond the means of 
regular families.  In this sense, students see how their families can use all of their contacts, 
influence and combined financial resources in a massive attempt to “pull levers” and give a 
student the opportunity to advance.  Furthermore, when an institution of higher education 
does not succeed in properly socializing a student, their family often fills in by providing 
different behavioral models320.  In this sense, if the university were dishonest, the family then 
fails to provide an alternative model of honest behavior.  Therefore, corrupt selection as a 
function of coordinated family efforts can directly lead to an even more serious corrupt 
conditioning of graduates. 
  7.3.2.) Socialization via Family Influence 
Comprehensively corrupt behavior on the part of Russian elite families socializes their 
children to engage in corruption despite the influences of higher education.  Students that 
have families with high levels of influence and money see all of these resources leveraged to 
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get a better education than other students321.  Higher education, for many of Russia's new 
elite, is not a key part of human capital formation, nor is it essential in establishing a future 
career.  After graduation, the inheritance of positions among bureaucrats has become almost a 
fact of life322, which means that elite students can now count on a guaranteed position after 
graduation without needing earn it through competition.  In the Soviet Union direct family 
inheritance of prestigious occupations was uncommon.  In fact, families did ensure that their 
children were provided for in the state apparatus, but at a much, much lower rank - five or six 
levels lower than their parents323.  This high level behavior contrasts with the expectations of 
average high school students, who still believe, before they enter a university, that effort and 
achievement would lead to success324.  Even though everyday corruption can be somewhat 
hidden from one's children before they reach university age, it is impossible to do this 
completely.  This effect is compounded by the corrupting effect of a corrupt university325.  
The human capital effects of corrupt selection independent of socialization can be similarly 
damaging. 
 The implications of corrupt selection practices are directly felt in terms of both human 
capital and institutional effectiveness.  Selection corruption violates an essential characteristic 
of elite universities - the objective selection of the most qualified students by the most 
competitive institutions.  By selecting potentially non-competitive students in favor of those 
with the ability to bribe or influence, the overall reputation of the university logically suffers, 
as might the career prospects of its graduates.  Exceptional levels of training could potentially 
compensate for the admission of otherwise less-accomplished students.  This view, however, 
is mitigated by a very important part of human capital's relation to higher education - training.  
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The value of training in enhancing human capital could increase the overall human capital 
value of graduates, even if less qualified candidates are chosen for admission.  The Michigan 
Law example demonstrates that in certain situations, even students that are admitted in a 
preferential manner still are able to achieve levels of human capital no less than that of their 
peers.  However, the process of corrupt selection has a qualitatively different nature than 
affirmative action - not so much righting what was perceived to be a social injustice or 
increasing access for the less affluent, but selling the social prestige of an elite institution 
outright with the risk of destroying the value of what is being sold.  Whereas training is 
unaffected by selection alone, its effectiveness is undermined by unprepared students.  Those 
selected by corrupt means are often less prepared and less motivated than their peers, which 
would cause them to require a great deal of remedial instruction.  Furthermore, the human 
capital signaling function, which supposedly guarantees a basic valuation of a student's 
capabilities, is completely undermined by selection corruption.  This contention, however, is 
only true if a university functions in an objectively unbiased and effective way. 
 7.4.) Mitigation  
Selection corruption could be interpreted as a means of leveling the playing field for 
Russian entrants so as to better account for inequalities in the Russian secondary and primary 
education systems.  For example, a student who has no opportunity to enter a proper 
university because of insufficient educational preparation still has a need to advance herself, 
and corruption could provide that means.  Even if the Russian selection system worked 
without bias or corruption, there is still no guarantee that it would only accept the most 
deserving applicants.  Secondary schools across the country are in various states of disrepair, 
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and there is no minimum level of guaranteed academic achievement.  University entrance 
exams may fall far from the ideal of providing accurate evaluations of a student's capabilities.  
Regular families could leverage all of their resources in an attempt to propel their most 
promising children to new heights of social status and professional success in a way that 
would be otherwise unthinkable if the system functioned properly.  If the Michigan example 
is applicable to Russian institutions, then this method of accessibility would be a truly 
positive method for increasing access to higher education to traditionally underrepresented 
groups (those that lacked either the luck of living in a capital city or belonging to an 
influential family).  This optimistic view of corruption, although appealing at times, is not 
always supported by the facts.  Corrupt access is regulated by levels of entrenched influence 
and wealth, which is as exclusive as any institutional insufficiency. This distinction is 
especially when clear when corruption is compared to reform measures that seek to increase 
access.  
  7.4.1.) EGE Description 
 The recently adopted unified state examination, the EGE, demonstrates both the 
presence and the dangers of the traditional selection system.  The primary impact of the EGE 
is twofold: the standardization of academic evaluation criteria and the centralization of 
admissions evaluation.  The test, prepared in Moscow, serves as a way to prevent favoritism 
and otherwise dishonest influence that is brought to bear via selection committees326.  This 
step, considered radical by many in the thoroughly conservative educational establishment, 
has been widely criticized by educators, but praised by many policy makers.  The World Bank 
and OECD prescribed a similar policy for the Russian Federation in 1999, which appears to 
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have been realized in a particularly Russian way327.  By looking at the effects of the EGE and 
reactions to its implementation, the broader picture of selection corruption becomes clear. 
 The adoption of the EGE was intended to improve educational access to students in 
less-developed regions of Russia and to clean up admissions corruption.  By leveling the 
playing field in terms of academic requirements, less well-equipped institutions can still 
prepare their students to enter an institute of higher education due to standardized testing 
requirements.  In this sense, location, familiarization with specific universities' tests and social 
contact with selection committees would have far less influence than before.  The EGE's main 
characteristic, multiple-choice questions, allows for a very fast and quantifiable evaluation of 
one student's academic abilities in comparison to others, and it also allows for students to be 
tested on the same material all across the country.  This kind of standardization allows for 
reducing the role of local institutions in misrepresenting students' achievement via their own 
substandard evaluation standards and local educational corruption.   
 In another important regard, the EGE allows for students to avoid paying the high cost 
of traveling to a distant capital city in order to take university-specific exams, thereby 
removing a major barrier to less affluent students entering Russia's most prestigious 
institutions.  This advance in educational policy, however, is not without its detractors. 
  7.4.2.) EGE Criticisms 
 The EGE has been widely and comprehensively criticized by the Russian educational 
establishment.  After it was announced, a majority of Russian higher educational institutions 
categorically opposed the EGE for a variety of reasons328.  Examples of such uniform 
condemnation of this reform persist today329, and they can be remarkably severe in 
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character330.  First of all, the Russian educational establishment seems to be categorically 
opposed to any reform effort331 332, going so far as to having 79% of academic experts 
condemn any new reforms333, even the emergence of private universities334.  In fact it appears 
that the Russian higher educational administration is determined to "wall itself off from 
modern times"335.  A 2006-2007 poll of Russian students also displays high levels of 
cynicism in this regard336.  These consistently high levels of resistance seem surprisi
considering the nature of specific complaints regarding the EGE. 
ng when 
 Specific criticisms of the EGE are for reasons that often appear to be very generalized, 
purely technical and highly esoteric.  One of the most popular criticisms of the EGE is that it 
is simply too large of a task to be undertaken337, an unacceptably complicated logistic 
challenge.  Another major criticism is that the questions are actually too specific or too 
mundane338.  In a more internationally familiar sense, the EGE raises the objection among 
educators that the multiple-choice format is an inadequate type of evaluation339, and that it 
forces "teaching to the test" instead of a more traditional, humanistic approach340.  Another 
criticism is that the EGE devalues secondary education, since grades count for less than the 
results of this one test341.  An unexpectedly candid EGE criticism is reinforced by students 
and teachers complaining that the test is simply too hard, and that otherwise exceptional 
students get scores that are too low342 343.  This point of view is supported by the thousands of 
students who ended up failing the test in 2009, despite regularly receiving the high grades in 
high school344.  Even such a prominent figure as President Medvedev weighed in on the EGE, 
describing its results as problematic345.  This list of complaints is complicated by accusations 
of wrongdoing in the test itself. 
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 Accusations of corruption and dishonesty in the EGE are common.  Many educators 
and administrators have complained about recent EGE testing scandals, where it was alleged 
that widespread cell-phone cheating was allowed or that test results could be purchased346.  
Just such a scandal was noted in the province of Tatarstan, where two officials and rectors 
were accused of selling EGE answers347.  In the most recent round of EGE testing, there was 
a major scandal about the test being corrupted in the region of Dagestan; a scandal erupted
when it was revealed that four times as many students took the EGE in that region than were 
graduated from the region's high schools
 
348 349.  Anecdotal evidence from other sources about 
the ability of students to cheat openly and even buy exams is plentiful350.  In this regard, the 
EGE is interpreted as a major source of potential corruption, engendering the very problem 
that it should resolve.  In a particularly telling perspective, however, many educational elites 
are perceived as criticizing the EGE for the very reason it could be effective: that it 
substantially reduces corruption and limits bribes to educational elites351.  What is interesting 
about many of these criticisms is that the existing system exhibits many of these same 
characteristics.   
 Almost all criticisms of the EGE can effectively be leveled at the previous system. The 
university-specific system was a massive and cumbersome logistical undertaking that never 
allowed students to accurately prepare for entrance exams.  Teaching to the test couldn't be 
done in the old system, which is one way that the EGE presents different challenges.  
However, this is because individual university testing requirements weren't uniform, nor 
could they be predicted in detail.  The objection of how the EGE devalues the secondary 
education system is also present, since many average students completely disregard their 
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grades so as to best prepare for specific college and entrance exams352.  Other objections are 
based on the rumored corruption of the EGE353.  Such charges are in no small supply in the 
current system, as presented in the previous section.  In terms of the objections involving 
corruption and the ability to cheat, such possibilities are abundant in the current system to 
such a degree that a reform like the EGE was necessary.  One critic admitted that despite 
myriad shortcomings of the EGE, it is still better than the previous system354.  Students and 
academics have also noted that despite the EGE's problems, the system it replaced was far 
more troubled355 356.  In order to best understand the validity of these criticisms, it is also 
essential to understand their broader context. 
 Many criticisms of the EGE are either completely manufactured or serve as telling 
examples of the test's effectiveness.  In terms of corruptibility, there are anecdotal accounts of 
how Russian elites are frustrated with their newfound inability to engage in selection 
corruption to ensure their children's admission357.  In another example, a major objection to 
the EGE by students is that the test is actually far too difficult358.  As many as 25% of 
students who take the test end up failing, despite their high school grades359.  One group of 
students noted that the test was unfair, because it was too hard to cheat on it360.  Anti-c
practices are used, such as regularly checking the restroom in order to force cheaters back into 
the testing hall 
heating 
361 and disrupt the practice of texting friends and family for help during the 
test362.  Some students from capital cities actually criticize the test due to the fact that it 
disadvantages them by leveling the playing field for less privileged students363 364.  This kind 
of criticism also is leveled at the evaluative capabilities of the test itself. 
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 The overall weakness of EGE opposition demonstrates that opposition to the test many 
not be purely on educational grounds.  In one particularly telling episode, a recent class that 
was admitted in Fall of 2009 to MGU Zhurfak (journalism school), was publicly criticized by 
their professor for horribly failing a basic diagnostic exam - the worst result in twenty years.  
This episode was remarkable, because so many of those that failed actually had remarkable 
EGE results, even though mistakes were found in nearly every single word and phrase.  Such 
a scandal suddenly took on a massive scale and was used as a prime example of the EGE's 
ineffectiveness in determining the value of aspiring students.  As it later turned out, the 
professor of this class made up the entire episode, feeling that the original results were so 
outstanding that her class had no value for her students365 366.  The ferocity with which the 
test is criticized by the educational establishment, combined with the weakness of these ve
criticisms leads one to conclude that these individuals may not be attacking this reform for an 
objective reason.  Furthermore, despite relentless criticism from the educational 
establishment, the EGE appears to have been successful in reducing selection corruption
ry 
367.  
The areas where the EGE seems to be limited are in its inability to reduce labor market 
corruption368 and non-selection corruption, which may mitigate its effectiveness in 
comprehensively resolving Russian higher educational corruption. 
  7.4.3.) EGE Effectiveness 
 The EGE has effectively and beneficially restructured the way that university 
admissions are undertaken.  Most universities now look primarily to the EGE in order to 
determine the candidacy of a given student, with some even taking the unprecedented step of 
ignoring the influence and wealth of a student's parents369.  This trend has increased access to 
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elite higher education for students of the more remote regions of Russia370.  Furthermore, the 
ability of students to apply to multiple universities around the country has allowed for a much 
broader selection of students371.  This new level of access has allowed for universities to be 
visibly ranked in terms of competitiveness and desirability among students in an 
unprecedented way.  These advantages were recently confirmed in a radio interview with a 
Moscow professor, who noted that students from the regions of Russia with high EGE scores 
were exceptional students, but local Muscovites were entirely unmotivated and very prone to 
cheat or bribe372.  Even with its positive results, universities can still have some influence in 
determining the admissions to certain special faculties. 
 The introduction of the EGE has greatly reduced the influence of a given university in 
determining the criteria for admissions while allowing for some flexibility.  With many 
prestigious universities, additional university exams are required for specialized faculties.  At 
the prestigious capital institutions, SPbGU and MGU, the economics, law, medicine and 
journalism faculties all require one additional exam to evaluate a student's specialized 
knowledge, which is written and administered by the university.  The olympiad results for 
individual students, the country-wide academic competition that guarantees access to higher 
education, represent a third means of determining admissions qualifications373.  In the case of 
Saint Petersburg's renowned FINEK university, many students were admitted in 2009 without 
serious  consideration of the EGE scores, but based on their special status and olympiad 
results374.  Unfortunately, shocking score discrepancies375, rumors of corruption and bribery 
undermine the reliability of the olympiad376.  Despite this exception, university selection 
committees have far less room to arbitrarily influence admissions decisions, and the EGE is 
67 
the primary means by which selection is determined377.  The EGE has truly accomplished a 
significant reduction in selection corruption in the Russian Federation378.  However, selection 
corruption still exists in different forms379 380. 
 The EGE's effectiveness can be seen in shifts in corrupt behavior.  According to 
contemporary Russian educational experts, the EGE has completely disrupted the old system 
of corrupt selection381.  State bureaucrats and other privileged elites are extremely frustrated 
that their clout and corruption suddenly can no longer guarantee their children an elite higher 
education382.  In a typically market-driven way, the introduction of the EGE appears to have 
led to increased secondary and primary education corruption, so as to ensure the best possible 
preparation for one's children383.  A significant recent development in corruption practices is 
that parents have started to give up on bribing their kids' way through the EGE, realizing that 
doing so is very unreliable.  Instead, they have started to increase bribing at other levels, so 
that their children can get the best possible preparation - beginning as early as kindergarten384.  
In fact, this effect is so pronounced that university bribes have dropped by 21%, whereas 
kindergartens have become "hotbeds of corruption on an unheard of scale," leading to the 
creation of an entire kindergarten corruption market and the establishment of kindergarten 
corruption hotlines in Moscow and Saint Petersburg385. 
 Furthermore, the fact that many straight-A students fail the exam can be interpreted as 
demonstrating either the inability of schools to provide for students' basic academic needs or 
how cheating and bribery activity do not translate to EGE success.  This trend can be seen in 
how many winners of nationwide "olympiad" student competitions for university entry 
actually earn highly uncompetitive EGE scores386.   In another example, a new kind of 
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attempt at selection corruption has emerged - falsely applying for special needs status387 388.  
In some Moscow universities, entire faculties are full of students that have been officially 
classified as disabled or having "special needs"389.  The advantage of such status is that one 
does not have to take the EGE with other students, granting a university the opportunity to 
admit a student based on non-EGE factors.  This practice only adds another compone
corrupt transaction - a corrupt doctor that will attest to one's physical inability in the same 
way that he would for someone trying to avoid the highly unpopular Russian draft.  These 
developments demonstrate not only that selection corruption can be fought, but that it is a 
very widespread and resilien
nt in a 
t phenomenon. 
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8.) GRADING CORRUPTION 
 8.1.) Identification and Definition Adherence 
 Grading corruption comprehensively fits any definition of corruption.  This is a 
voluntary act by a professor or student to receive or issue grades that have been influenced by 
something other than academic merit.  This can be from many different sides, either a student 
bribing for a better grade or a passing grade, or the more stunning rent-seeking behavior on 
the part of professors for an honest or non-failing grade.  This meets the voluntary 
requirement, in the sense that it cannot be initiated without the voluntary behavior of students 
or the professor.  This kind of practice should be distinguished from the overall grade 
inflation, which was present in the Soviet Union390 and today.  Academic professionals were 
under pressure to demonstrate the effectiveness of their institutions or protect the reputation of 
a student's prestigious family and thereby inflated grades to meet expectations391.  This kind 
of activity was hidden, internal and was rarely the result of a corrupt student-teacher 
interaction, so much as one of a teacher with a corrupt administration.  However, it had a 
similar effect to modern grading corruption in that it undermined the institution by using the 
institution’s clout and authority to illegitimately verify the academic ability of an undeserving 
student. 
 8.2.) Methods and Examples 
 8.2.1.) Supply Side Corruption 
 Grading corruption is the awarding of illegitimate grades to undeserving students for 
bribes or other gifts, which represents a special kind of supply-side corruption.  The standard 
reasons for grading corruption are often cited: teachers are too poor, universities need the 
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extra money, that the transition period socialized corrupt behavior and so forth.  However, the 
essential difference between grading corruption’s supply and that of other kinds of corruption 
is the corrupt transaction itself.  Grading corruption can occur on an individual level, without 
the overarching corrupt organizations that are necessary for selection corruption and financial 
corruption.  An individual teacher can make a decision to either extort their students or not, 
depending on their own moral decision and set of incentives.  By identifying problem students 
and offering to pass them for a bribe, while leaving successful students alone, a professor can 
tailor corrupt practices to her audience.  This level of autonomy speaks to the individual 
motives of professors to engage in corruption and the degree to which students feel free to 
resist or comply. 
 Grading corruption is a regretfully common practice in the Russian Federation's higher 
education system.  As many as 39% of Russian students have admitted to receiving grades 
dishonestly392.  In another poll, anywhere from 11-19% of Russians have admitted to paying 
bribes for admission or grades393.  This number appears low, since as many as 25% of 
students are ready to bribe for grades394.  In terms of instructor willingness to accept bribes, 
the proportion fluctuates by region from 27-35%395.  Such results appear to mark a significant 
increase from 2004, where 10% of instructors regularly accepted bribes396.  This high level 
demonstrates that despite inconsistent levels of reported grading corruption, it can appear as a 
systemic phenomenon. 
 The organization present in highly developed grading corruption schemes 
demonstrates that such an illegitimate practice can be realized as a systemic phenomenon.  
Grading corruption is often coordinated across departments or universities397.  The most 
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popular classes for grading corruption are bothersome, seemingly unnecessary 
prerequisites398, such as basic math in a literature program or literature in an engineering 
program.  The degree to which this system is developed is truly profound and even 
demonstrates the emergence of micro-markets of corruption.  There are widespread systems 
of middlemen, often recruited students, who are capable of acting as couriers for corrupt 
grading transactions399.  Furthermore, there are even hidden “price lists” that are circulated 
among student groups that list the going rates for certain grades in certain classes400.  Other 
professors are more blatant in their corruption, announcing their price lists during lectures on 
the eve of final exams401.  In some institutions, there are pricing incentives given to students 
to pay reduced bribes for guaranteeing good grades at the beginning of the semester, as 
opposed to being forced to pay closer to finals402.  In some higher educational institutions, 
students who resist the corrupt grading scheme are forced to leave403.  This completely 
subverted system of grading and its massive scale are particularly harmful for future student 
development, especially in the realm of producing students who are ready to engage in future 
corruption. 
  8.2.2.) Demand side Corruption 
 Whereas supply-side corruption represents the corruptibility of a system, demand side 
grading corruption serves as an indicator of the degree of socialized corruption among 
students.  The concept of demand-side corruption is that the primary corrupting influence and 
request for corrupt activity comes from the party without authority.  Students act on their own 
initiative to offer a bribe to professors, who may or may not be already engaging in corrupt 
behavior of their own.  It has been estimated that students are responsible for initiating one 
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half of all corruption transactions404.  This is supported by a 2009 study, in which nearly half 
of Russian students were predicted to buy their exams, potentially creating nearly $150 
million in bribes405.  The reasons for demand-side grading corruption are significant in the 
sense that they represent similar pressures, but from unique perspectives.  The most common 
and cynical reason that students engage in corruption is that they simply cannot be bothered to 
undergo the necessary rigor of properly learning course material.  Some students feel a sense 
of entitlement or simply disregard academic standards to the degree that they readily bribe 
their professors.  In this sense, corrupt student behavior has been sufficiently socialized to the 
point that they decide to resolve their conflicts by applying corrupt tactics instead of 
redoubling honest efforts in an honest environment. Even if their behavior isn't sufficiently 
socialized to routinize corrupt behavior, the perception of corruptibility makes such behavior 
at least worth a risk.  This kind of behavior is reinforced by families, of which 50% are ready 
to engage in bribery to resolve everyday education issues406, which coincidentally parallels 
the figure of 50-60% of Russian students that are estimated to regularly participate in grading 
corruption407.  This is an interesting figure, since according to MVD estimates, students 
initiate corrupt transactions in 50% of all cases408.  In some cases, however, students can be 
compelled by systemic pressures to engage in grading corruption. 
 Systemic pressures can force students to engage in bribery in two different ways.  The 
first of these ways is a lack of time and financial pressure due to the high cost of living and 
studying. Students to take on demanding work schedules409, and due to scarce time, financial 
priorities often win out, and students are forced to skip large numbers of classes on a regular 
basis in order to earn enough money to support themselves410.  Due to this, and a lack of time 
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to sufficiently prepare for final exams and write papers, students are forced to try to meet their 
academic obligations via bribery411.  Another systemic pressure for Russian students is that 
their professors and classes can be hopelessly disorganized or excessively demanding412, 
which prevents students from properly preparing to meet their evaluation requirements.  
Professorial misconduct and poor lesson planning can frustrate even the most sincere efforts 
to earn academic credentials, as can unrealistically difficult final exams that are required by 
unqualified professors.  One example of this situation is where a student's exam was marked 
down unfairly, since the grading professor actually did not properly understand the material 
herself413.  It should be noted that from the student’s perspective, all professor-initiated 
corruption is systemic, since it shapes the microsocial systems that this corruption occurs in.  
In its own way, this perception of universal corruption can compel students to utilize grading 
corruption as a means of remaining competitive with other students that bribe414.  The nature 
of grading corruption is not always that of a financial transaction, since certain academic 
professionals may display partial treatment for far less attractive incentives. 
  8.2.3.) Soft Corruption 
Grading corruption that is accomplished without financial outlays and without 
influence peddling can be referred to as “soft corruption.”  Non-monetary forms of corruption 
may be more prevalent in higher education than old fashioned bribery415.  In terms of 
selection corruption, the potential reward is so great, that major influence or bribery is 
required, but on individual exams, something less compelling can be sufficient.  In situations 
where rent-seeking isn’t actively applied, teachers can be swayed to change student grades 
due to low-cost gifts or other reasons.  In fact, it is legal for professors and administrators to 
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receive gifts that cost less than 500 RUR416.  In many cases, students provide the standard 
gifts to their professors at the end of the year, such as chocolates, champagne, cognac or 
flowers in order to sway their opinion417 418.  For certain professors, this is enough to 
guarantee a good grade, or at least leniency419.  Favoritism or favorable biases towards 
supplicant students also changes grades, but for different reasons420.  A professor could be the 
source of such corruption by giving a student the opportunity to re-take an exam, impartially 
grading them each time.  Professors often will agree to that for no bribe at all421.  Thus, there 
are potential human capital implications for grading corruption, even if it doesn't involve 
financial bribery. 
Some teachers actively help their students to cheat, or they simply cannot bear to give 
them a bad grade.  This has been identified in many cases, especially in a recent exam format 
experiment.  When the traditional “Russian” method was used to administer exams, 
widespread cheating and grade inflation was noted.  But, when the “European” method was 
used – checking for cheaters, actually punishing cheaters, using anonymous exam grading and 
having someone other than the regular teacher administer the exam produced fundamentally 
different results422.  The essential conclusion by observers was that Russian teachers develop 
a sentimentality towards their own students over a semester, which allows a great deal of 
permissiveness during exams and very lenient grading423.  Such behavior was also observed 
by a prominent radio announcer, when her teacher helped her cheat in chemistry and math on 
graduate exams424.  In another case, some professors had grown so attached to their students 
by the end of the semester that they announce to everyone that everyone would pass no matter 
what425.  Other professors have policies of never giving students the equivalent of a "D"426.  
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This kind of grade changing for purely sentimental reasons is important, because it gives no 
tangible private benefit as a bribe would, yet it is still seen as corrupt.  However, not all 
grading corruption is necessarily in the positive direction. 
Negative sentimental grading corruption is also an unfortunate feature of Russian 
higher education.  Professors have been known to arbitrarily reduce the grades of some 
students without explanation.  The difficulty in analyzing this question or even including it in 
a discussion of corruption at all is that it is hard to firmly identify it in practice.  Negative 
sentimental corruption can be a mistaken form of extortion if a student does not want to or 
know how to bribe.  However, there is some compelling anecdotal evidence.  As mentioned 
before in the EGE discussion, one professor arbitrarily reduced the grades of her students.  
This was done, because her students' results were actually so phenomenal that they had no 
need to study her subject427 428.  Unfortunately, other similar stories are found in the personal 
histories of many recent graduates and current students of Russian universities.  A student 
illegitimately receiving an inflated or deflated grade has the same effects regardless of the 
source.  Teachers approving widespread cheating or deciding to provide undeserving grades 
on their own initiative produces the exact same results as widespread bribery. 
 8.3.) Implications 
 Grading corruption, possibly more than any other type of higher educational 
corruption in Russia, can shock Western observers, since it undermines the fundamental 
purpose and value of higher education.  The essential function of a university is to transmit 
knowledge and verify this transmission to anonymous parties, guaranteeing the quality of 
graduates via official degrees.  When grading corruption is present, no knowledge 
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transmission is necessary, only a simple payment, and a student is validated as demonstrating 
accomplishment.  This kind of corruption strikes at the heart of both areas of university 
education’s role in human capital development and further socializes corrupt behavior. 
 
 8.3.1.) Socializing corruption 
Socializing corrupt behavior is elevated to a new level by grading corruption.  By 
constantly exposing students to threats, rent-seeking behavior or simply giving them the 
opportunity to finally profit from corruption instead of suffer from it, the unavoidable and 
constant presence of grading corruption is uniquely harmful among other corruption types.  
Students look to teachers as models of future behavior, and when confronted with corruption, 
they can readily become corrupt themselves429.  Selection corruption is a one-time affair, and 
financial corruption neither requires student participation nor does it allow regular student 
observation.  By immersing students in a corrupt system of academic extortion and 
illegitimacy, they can develop habits specifically in relation to corruption and ultimately can 
adapt to survival in a profoundly corrupt professional environment.  Even if not completely 
socialized, students can thoroughly adapt themselves to a corrupt environment, which makes 
such behavior far easier in the future.  In this case, not only do students advance in terms of 
corruption via selection, but they come to rely on it as a regular mechanism of success.  This 
kind of behavior could easily be applied at the workplace by engaging in corrupt market 
practices.  Victims, corrupting students, and grading corruption middlemen could all later 
come to engage in widespread corruption in order to realize even the most rudimentary 
personal goals, at the expense of an honest application of their skills. 
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 8.3.2.) Training 
The undermining of a university’s evaluation quality and verification fundamentally 
subverts its functions to the detriment of human capital via falsely verifying training.  
Regardless of demand-side or supply-side corruption, grading corruption severely de-
incentivizes academic accomplishment and honest work, preventing effective learning430.  By 
forcing students to pay for their grades in any situation, a student stands to benefit without 
serious exertion.  Therefore, given even a purely rational perspective, a student’s short-term 
goals are easily met via bribery, if there is even a choice to be made.  In the case of rent-
seeking, teachers can make no effort to teach or even come to class, thereby completely 
abandoning the course and their students.  This kind of behavior actively denies important 
knowledge transmission and verification to students, leaving them worse equipped to deal 
with the technical and skill requirements of their future professions.  Even though skills are 
neglected by grading corruption, the precise human capital implications of such a 
phenomenon are vague, due to the low practical value of Russian higher education curricula 
and the overwhelming value of on-the-job training in terms of skill acquisition – 90% from 
one’s job and only 10% from other sources431.  Despite the uncertain harmful effects of 
allowing the neglectful treatment of students to cause skill deprivation atrophy, the 
appearance of institutional approval via grades carries its own consequences in the labor 
market. 
 8.3.3.) Signaling 
Grading corruption’s effects on university credibility fundamentally harms Russian 
human capital via false signaling.  Since a fundamental role of education is the accurate 
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signaling of the potential value of a graduate to the labor market, grade corruption severely 
distorts the ability of employers to understand signals432 433.  In fact, the relative prestige of an 
academic degree assumes an unbiased attestation of academic ability.  Companies all over the 
Russian Federation and the world give graduates from elite universities special consideration 
when hiring, and Russian universities have been recently ranked in based mostly on career 
opportunities.  These universities, subsequently, are the most selective, which supposes a 
higher degree of qualification for their students and graduates.  Selection corruption 
undermines the notion that the best candidates are selected, but grading corruption ensures 
that graduates are not truly worthy of the elite degrees that they have supposedly earned, 
thereby mitigating the potential benefits of institutional influence on future student 
performance and behavior as with Michigan Law.  Whereas the deficiencies presented by 
selection corruption could theoretically be compensated for with superior training and positive 
institutional influence on a student's soft skills, grading corruption prevents this entirely.   
 Non-corrupt higher education signaling is essential for many firms in determining the 
value of a potential employee.  Whereas productive training and hard skill formation is mostly 
undertaken on the job, identifying candidates is mostly done via either interpersonal 
connections or looking to academic qualifications.  This kind of selection is based on the 
assumption that the best graduates show the most potential to gain from training and to 
effectively contribute to the organization.  Provided that this perspective is a real 
representation of a person’s labor value, then grading corruption specifically creates a 
misallocation of human resources within an economy, thereby losing value due to 
inefficiency.  This also prevents any consistent valuation policy based on a university’s 
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prestige, since there is no clear way to tell whether a graduate has necessary skills or not.  
Furthermore, once a university is perceived as being corrupt, it actually begins to send out 
negative signals to the labor market434.  Considering these implications, it is essential to 
examine measures that are taken to reduce the impacts of grading corruption. 
 8.4.) Mitigation 
 The practice of grading corruption may be exaggerated.  Despite earlier figures, there 
are not many students that have encountered supply-side grading corruption - only 8.2%435.  
In this regard, perhaps the students are providing the impetus, which may lead to a 
corresponding corruption of the system itself.  However, there is another view of students 
who see grading corruption as fundamentally immoral and condemnable436.  Furthermore, 
much as EGE corruption accusations many be the product of disgruntled corruptors that could 
not influence the system, grading corruption could be the target of similar behavior.  Some 
accusations of corruption have been leveled by some students who actively use perceptions of 
corruption to their own advantage by fabricating stories of professorial misconduct as a way 
to rationalize a perceived unjust grade437.  Regardless of potential inaccuracies in measuring 
the true levels of grading corruption, society has moved to try and police it. 
 8.5.) Anti-Corruption 
 Russian corruption, for all its ubiquity, does not exist in a vacuum, and anti-corruption 
efforts are widespread.  There are many methods that have been adopted for fighting Russian 
corruption, ranging from creating hotlines to launching massively publicized anti-corruption 
campaigns.  However, the effectiveness of such measures has been questionable.  A 
fundamental objection to overall anti-corruption efforts is that there has been too much 
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attention paid to low-level, everyday corruption, which ignores the more serious cases of 
high-level corruption438.  This is despite the fact that most Russians see corruption as most 
prevalent and inexcusable among high-level officials439.  In another sense, a blanket approach 
towards policing corruption in higher education won’t be fully effective, since the relationship 
between student and professor is more nuanced than that of a citizen and a bureaucrat.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that ant-corruption efforts in Russia have not been directed at 
student cheating so much as policing the actions of professors and administrators, so this 
examination will only address the behavior of those in positions of authority. 
  8.5.1.) Description and Effectiveness 
 The most common methods of fighting corruption in developed nations - public 
activity and official punishment - have been used in the Russian Federation.  There are a wide 
variety of standard methods of detecting and arresting corrupt actors, with varying uses and 
methods of reporting440.  In some cases, professors or administrators are arrested and 
prosecuted441, occasionally in significant numbers442.  In some areas of the country, like 
Vladimir and Penze, there have been highly publicized cases of professors being arrested for 
student extortion443.  In another case, student resistance at Moscow State University and 
appeals to the Russian parliament resulted in the closing of a cafeteria that was run by the 
dean's son, which charged outrageous prices444.  Such popular resistance can also be seen 
with the establishment of a website, "vzjatkam.net," in 2006 as a response to ineffec
government policies
tive 
445.  The website has since been shut down. 
 Unfortunately, the number of professors and academic professionals investigated for 
corruption falls far, far short of the estimated 30%-40% who regularly take bribes446, despite 
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the fact that such investigations increased by 50% from 2008-2009447.  This number rarely 
exceeds one hundred, possibly due to the enforcement procedures.    In another example, a 
recent MVD anti-corruption effort in higher education, "Образование - 2009," only 97 
instances of bribery were revealed448.  The standard procedure is difficult to apply regularly, 
since in order to prove corruption, a willing student must come forward and provide 
substantial proof, which is a rare occurrence449.  This is further complicated by the law that 
professors are able to receive gifts of less than 3,000 RUR450, which may be close to the 
market price for an exam bribe.  Therefore, the only way to catch a professor is to do it either 
in the act itself or as the result of accepting a mass bribe for an entire class451.  This system 
has been the subject of a great deal of criticism. 
  8.5.2.) Criticisms 
 Traditional methods of punitive anti-corruption measures are very unsuccessful in 
reducing large-scale corruption in the Russian Federation.  A major source of the failure of 
anti-corruption efforts is the lack of participation by victims in terms of hotlines and reports of 
corruption.  At one university where exam bribery is ubiquitous, the corruption hotline is 
completely unused452.  Unfortunately, most anti-corruption campaigns are one-time only and 
lack the necessary longevity in order to be effective453.  Another drawback of this system is 
that it requires catching someone in the act, which is a very rare occurrence454.  Sentencing 
for a corrupt offense is very difficult due to middlemen and legal covers455. One must 
establish a clear causal connection between the bribe and the result, and prosecution is ve
easy to avoid
ry 
 
456.  One major reason for the lack of significant success is the necessary 
participation of observers457.  An additional problem could be intimidation.  Many victims or
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participants in corrupt activity rightly fear retaliation, leading to a lack of information and 
prosecution458 459 460.  In another sense, many students and other "victims" of corruption ma
be interested in the perpetuation of a system that they see as benefiting th
y 
eir interests461. 
 Another problem is the ineffectiveness of internal policing policies.  In the area of 
dissertation and doctoral degrees, despite widely perceived perceptions only one percent of 
dissertations are rejected on the basis of plagiarism462.  Traditional anti-corruption efforts take 
a centralized stance on policing corruption, which can simply lead to a redistribution of 
corrupt authority, while falsely claiming success463.  As mentioned earlier, anti-corruption 
efforts often focus on low-level actors, leaving higher functionaries untouched.  Recent anti-
corruption efforts confirmed this trend in 2004 and 2005464.  The typical professor who was 
arrested took a small bribe for an exam, but there are almost no accounts of arrests being 
made for accepting a 40,000 Euro bribe for entering a law school.  In recent years, the number 
of investigations launched against corrupt higher education professionals has often been 
between 65 and 100465.  Another difficulty posed by the current punitive system is that those 
caught in corrupt deals can escape without punishment and professional repercussions for 
bribery offenses466 467 and professional misconduct.  Even when those caught are 
appropriately punished and removed from their positions, corrupt hierarchies persist468. 
  8.5.3.) Effectiveness 
 Many anti-corruption efforts can be counterproductive.  A classic, cynical use of 
social perceptions of corruption is to protect oneself from investigation by characterizing anti-
corruption efforts as corrupt themselves469.  This practice can be seen throughout former-
communist countries, and are considered de rigueur in the Russian Federation.  President 
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Medvedev's recent anti-corruption initiative in 2008 has been characterized as fundamentally 
corrupt and questionable470.  The EGE is another excellent example of such a phenomenon.  
Despite the fact that it is being advanced by the central ministries of education and science, it 
has been vigorously opposed in every possible way by a majority of universities471.  Internal 
policing of corrupt activity can be ineffective, since profiting hierarchies aren't interested in 
reducing their income472.  Corruption within enforcement agencies can also prevent effective 
anti-corruption measures473.  Even when one part of the organization may function correctly, 
another may then cover up for the accused corrupt actor.  The example of krugi becomes 
especially important in this regard.  Overlapping connections that include policing 
organizations can provide other corrupt actors with an opportunity to both enhance their own 
influence and to protect themselves by exchanging their own access.  In this sense, system-
wide corruption, such as is found in Russia, could easily be considered self-protecting and 
self-renewing, even in the face of widespread anti-corruption initiatives474.  Many corrupt 
university administrations and coordinators of corruption protect their subordinates and 
complicit students from investigation475.  In another example, some corrupt bureaucrats 
simply aren't interested in prosecuting corruption, since they have already completely 
internalized and rationalized it to themselves476. 
 In another broader model of anti-corruption efforts, an overly severe and punishment-
oriented policy could lead to greater corruption, as seen with the Soviet model of fighting 
corruption477.  This kind of blanket authority to ruthlessly combat corruption appeals to 
citizens who feel powerless but often leads to abuse of authority and arbitrariness478.  The 
unfortunate result of such a situation is that citizens feel that corruption is "invincible"479.  
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Unfortunately, the inability of basic policing policies to prevent corruption may lead to even 
more damaging instances of corrupt activity. 
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9.) ACCREDITATION CORRUPTION 
 9.1.) Identification and Definition Adherence 
 Accreditation corruption stands apart from other forms of Russian higher education 
corruption in specific ways.  Professional schools such as law schools and medical schools 
provide accreditation to graduates in Russia, as opposed to the United States, where the ABA 
and AMA can provide medical licenses and law licenses to professionals.  Accreditation 
boards, functioning like selection boards, can choose to grant licenses due to bribery or other 
illegitimate considerations.  Like grading and selection corruption, there are two sides to this 
kind of corrupt activity, but attention will be focused on the act of issuing licenses to 
undeserving candidates. 
 9.2.) Methods and Examples 
 Accreditation corruption occurs in a simple way that does not strongly differ from 
previous types of corruption.  Aspiring professionals or graduates simply find a means to 
approach a corrupt review board member or intermediary and then determine the best means 
of bribery so that they can get their license to practice.  The mechanisms described in previous 
sections for selection corruption are applicable here as well, with the most popular being 
simple bribery.  Some medical students go through their entire university education without 
ever honestly taking a single exam, preferring to bribe or cheat exclusively480.  This fact is 
surprising for the simple reason that doctors are notoriously underpaid in Russia, and many 
look at medicine as only a profitable profession in the sense that someone could extort bribes 
from suffering patients.  Law schools, on the other hand, are higher up on the list of targets for 
corrupt entry481 482, and they provide greater promises of potential material success.  This 
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trend is not helped by the lack of an impartial legal accreditation organization, like the ABA 
in the United States483.  This condition is exacerbated by the massive number of professional 
schools that have appeared since the end of the Soviet Union.  Whereas higher education in 
general has greatly expanded, law schools have expanded from 52 in the Soviet Union to 
1147 today484.  In another regard, the training that occurs at medical schools in Russia is often 
either unsatisfactory or compromised completely by corruption485.  Despite poor technical 
skills and a profound lack of medical knowledge, these graduates are still given licenses and 
allowed to treat patients486.  Regardless of corrupt entry into a university and the corrupt 
grading practices that go on during one’s time of study, the issuance of licenses to practice 
medicine or law without ensuring a recipient’s qualifications is a profoundly damaging 
practice in the Russian Federation. 
 9.3.) Implications 
  9.3.1.) Socialization 
 For some Russian students, corruption unfortunately touches every aspect of one’s 
academic career, from entry, to grading to the issuing of a professional license.  This practice 
brings the idea of producing corrupt students full circle.  Whereas training shortcomings can 
be mitigated by private sector training, professional schools provide students with practical 
knowledge that they will apply every day in their later practice.  By the end of her education, 
a medical student could theoretically have earned a diploma that was paid for at every turn 
without truly applying herself on any occasion.  Therefore, she would be lacking in the skills 
that the state deems necessary in order to practice her profession, and she would have been 
simultaneously granted the social prestige associated with her university and profession via 
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pure corruption.  This professional validation adds yet another level of corrupt reinforcement 
and conditioning to an already highly exposed student.  The result is a barely-functioning 
professional who has been thoroughly conditioned to operate only in a corrupt system.  This 
kind of individual is likely interested in the continuation of corruption and corrupt policies as 
a means of guaranteeing advancement, and also likely aspiring to profit from the same system 
of corruption that they thrived in from the beginning.  Unfortunately, the use of corruption in 
accreditation and other practices can lead to a damaging lack of essential professional skills. 
  9.3.2.) Harm via Incompetence and Corruption 
 Accreditation corruption produces incompetence and a culture of responsibility 
avoidance that directly harms large numbers of Russian citizens.  Among lawyers, doctors and 
other professionals, skills and ethics are of the utmost importance, otherwise their services 
would become harmful to consumers.  Medical incompetence, unfortunately, is common in 
the Russian Federation.  This fact is backed up by endless anecdotal stories, even though 
official measurements of this phenomenon are often lacking.  One example was how the aunt 
of a renowned Moscow legal expert was hospitalized for two weeks in intensive care without 
an accurate diagnosis.  As it turns out, the reason why this woman was subjected to such 
demanding treatment was a single faulty thermometer, which was never checked or replaced 
by doctors or medical staff487.  This kind of behavior is not solely the result of a lack of 
essential skills. 
 Professional corruption is widespread in the Russian Federation and can render serious 
harm to the population as a whole.  According to surveys and recent national studies, doctors 
and teachers are considered to be the two most corrupt professions488, which may come from 
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systemic pressures as much as from socialized corruption.  In this context, the exact degree to 
which higher education influences pervasive medical corruption is similarly uncertain.  
Doctors and teachers are traditionally employed by the state.  State salaries in the Russian 
Federation are famously inadequate, which could compel all of these professionals to engage 
in corrupt activity.  As in higher education, there are institution-wide systems of organized 
corruption in state healthcare.  The degree to which higher education corruption incentivizes 
medical students to become corrupt doctors as opposed to being forced to join a corrupt 
healthcare system is also unclear.  However, by the time that medical students have finished 
their education, they have been thoroughly versed in all the necessary corrupt mechanisms to 
thrive in such a predatory market.   
 Not all corruption pressures could be systemic, as evidenced by lawyers. According to 
a leading professor of Putin's alma mater, the Saint Petersburg State Legal Faculty, effective 
legal education is key to maintaining the justice system489.  For lawyers and judges, 
corruption is doubly harmful, since they are often the only means of reforming a corrupt 
environment490, which may explain why people still trust lawyers, despite consistent reports 
of corruption.  This is especially troubling, since many students enter law school with the 
explicit intent to unethically manipulate laws to their benefit491.  This lack of reform potential, 
which seems to appear before entering a corrupt professional school, may obviate the effects 
of institutional corruption, since aspiring corrupt actors entering a corrupt system are already 
socialized by their history of dishonest behavior. 
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10.) ACADEMIC DISHONESTY 
 10.1.) Identification and Definition Adherence 
 Academic dishonesty is a problem as old as institutionalized education492; however it 
is now worthy of consideration as a form of corruption.  Cheating is often a prolonged, 
focused effort, designed to produce a singular goal, thereby being voluntary.  However, 
cheating does not require the complicity of an authority or institution.  Therefore, it may not 
actually affect an institution's functioning or professional culture, but it still has the same 
effects of producing unqualified graduates.  The goal, to receive a higher grade by dishonest 
means, demonstrates its illegitimate nature.  Finally, successful cheating undermines the value 
and role of the institution that contains it by producing graduates that have large amounts of 
unearned credit and undeservedly high grades.  Cheating in this context looks very similar to 
grading corruption in terms of both intent and implications, but it has two essential 
differences.  First of all, cheating is a one-sided action.  Teachers and authorities do not need 
to be complicit in order for cheaters to be successful and profit from their endeavors.  This is 
the same for both exam cheating and plagiarism.  Therefore cheating could produce the same 
effects as grading corruption, selection corruption and accreditation corruption in an 
institution that is both perfectly honest, yet unequipped to police cheating effectively.   
 10.2.) Methods and Examples 
  10.2.1.) Perceptions and Pervasiveness 
 Academic Dishonesty is common in the Russian higher educational system, with a 
robust history that dates back to the very beginning of Soviet education.  Some even go so far 
as to blame cheating behavior on the legacy of the Soviet Union493.  Cheating is a significant 
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cultural phenomenon in modern Russia, and it is considered to be less serious an issue than in 
the West494.  In fact, Russians perceive academic dishonesty as a ubiquitous, necessary, 
forgivable and benign part of education as a whole.  This attitude is reflected in many 
hallmarks of Russian cultural history, famously portrayed in the film Операция "Ы" и другие 
приключения Шурика495, (Operation "Y" and Other Adventures of Shurik) which has long 
since become a cornerstone of the Soviet golden era of film.  Students would go to 
extraordinary lengths to ensure their ability to either cheat on tests or to convince the 
professor to let them by with a passing grade, delighting Soviet audiences with their ingenuity 
and cunning.  Furthermore, this common trend is represented in a recent addition to a Russian 
university - the "Museum of Cheating."  In this museum, the long history of exotic and 
sophisticated Russian cheating techniques is explored, including a wide variety of cheat sheets 
- "Шпаргалки" (Shpargalki) or "Шпоры" (Shpory) for short496.  Cheat sheets have long been 
a hallmark of Russian and Soviet education 497 - best embodied by the opinion of cheat sheets 
by a teacher, "without them a student isn't a student"498.  This kind of attitude is well 
summarized in a joke about students: 
 Finals at the university.  
 The first year student makes cheat sheets in small print and thoroughly hides it in 
 every way. 
 The second year student makes a bigger cheat sheet with bigger print. 
 The third year student has his lecture notes on his knees during the test. 
 The fourth year student has his textbook on his desk during the exam. 
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 The fifth year student leafs through the textbook with his professor during the 
 exam, and after trying to point out the answer unsuccessfully several times, he 
 slams the book shut and shouts "Here!  Look for the answer yourself!"499 
This anecdote demonstrates both the widespread perception of cheating by students and the 
trend of cheating to grow worse as a student progresses.  If such humor were telling of actual 
behavior, it might serve as a perfect example of the ongoing socialization of corruption within 
a higher education system.  This joke is also a good indicator of the degree to which cheating 
is observed and expected in Russian universities. 
 Academic dishonesty in Russian higher education is a pervasive and resilient 
phenomenon.  As many as two thirds of Russians have admitted to cheating during their 
education, and 95% of Russian students see their friends as cheaters500.  Despite its ubiquity, 
it is still an under-examined phenomenon501.  However, the large amount of experience with 
cheating and the way that it shapes students to engage in later corrupt activity and game the 
system rather than thrive in it has been widely observed502.  Cheating is such a common 
phenomenon that the methods of its application are diverse and well-developed503.   
 Many cheating methods are accomplished with the help of peer groups and 
collaboration504.  Techniques range from the aforementioned cheat sheets and clothes with 
pre-written exam answers sewn in to the most advanced modern technological methods505 506.  
Cell-phones are currently one of the most common methods507.  Students send and receive 
test information via their cell-phones, assisted by their friends that are looking up informati
online
on 
508.  Sometimes, these remote supporters operate not via cell phones or text messages, 
but via hidden microphones509 510 511.  Such methods have increased in popularity to the point 
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that ready-made kits are advertised and sold in universities themselves512.  This technology 
has become so widespread that some universities have resorted to using advanced electronic 
countermeasures to try and enforce honest exam taking513 514.  Despite the newfound 
popularity of advanced technology, the old methods remain the most prevalent515.  The 
popular culture surrounding these methods is a good indicator of the degree of academic 
dishonesty, and very large numbers of Russian students admit to cheating regularly.  What is 
even more revealing is that Russian students have even come to cheat out of habit, rather than 
actually feeling a need to do so516.  In this way, cheating is evidence of a thoroughly 
socialized type of corrupt behavior that students instinctively use even when not incentivized 
to do so.  Repeated acts of bribery may have a similar effect if used for long enough.  Despite 
such serious implications of cheating, the Russian attitude toward such behavior is 
unexpectedly tolerant and even nostalgic. 
 Russians look at cheating in a tolerant and optimistic way.  The best way to capture 
the modern Russian attitude towards academic dishonesty and other forms is the same one 
expressed in American Ivy League schools at the beginning of the twentieth century - as a 
harmless, boyish prank or rite of passage that is expected among all students517.  This lack of 
concern is complicated, since in the Russian language the term used for cheating does not 
have such a severe connotation as in English.  The only equivalent term is "copying"518, 
which appears much less sinister to an impartial observer.  Many professors, students and 
parents even see the act of cheating as indirectly helpful.  The preparation of cheat sheets is 
considered to be an excellent means of cramming the night before the exam519 520 521.  
Regardless of the validity of such a benign perspective, most cheat sheets are no longer 
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prepared by students, but are ready-made for printing from websites dedicated to cheating522.  
Students often prepare them, conceal them in their pockets and then decide not to look at them 
during the exam523.  In some cases, however, professors have prepared cheat sheets 
themselves for their students524.  Other professors firmly believe in always giving their 
students another chance rather than giving too harsh a grade525.  Despite these occasional, 
reassuring changes of heart, a lot of Russian cheating behavior is incredibly brazen and 
flagrant526, including copying directly from a hidden textbook during an exam527.  In this 
regard, the joke about student life may be more indicative than otherwise expected.  Such 
mass involvement in cheating behavior reveals several important aspects of Russian student 
behavior and socialization. 
  10.2.2.) Causes - Incentives, Socialization and Identity 
   10.2.2.1.) Cheating Incentives as Corruption Incentives 
 Students engage in the act of cheating for the some of the same reasons that they 
would otherwise engage in corruption.  Systemic pressures and the casual acceptance of 
dishonest behavior both allow students to achieve success without putting in the necessary 
effort528.  Whereas some students would bribe for a grade, this is sometimes seen as a last 
resort or the result of rent-seeking behavior from a professor.  The much more common 
method of influencing one's grade dishonestly is cheating on exams, which is much better 
incentivized and cheaper529.  Not only are there systemic pressures to force dishonestly 
improving one's grade, but there are also many reasons not to fear any punishment for 
cheating.  Students have been exposed to a system where even the discovery of cheating is not 
seriously punished530.  A common practice among universities is to force those that are caught 
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cheating to simply re-take the exam531.  For many students, the goal here is to cheat at every 
opportunity, since there is no reason not to532.  Furthermore, this kind of exam re-taking could 
be considered a form of indirect grading corruption, since most students simply need to pay a 
fee to re-take any exam at the rector's office in order to try and improve their grade and to be a 
more successful cheater.  Students are often allowed to cheat by their professors, who simply 
take no action to police students' behavior533.  This is better evidenced by the fact that 
cheaters are actually relatively easy to spot534, yet few students are punished for such an 
infraction.  Such perceptions of a professor's illegitimacy can lead to increased cheating 
behavior among students by altering expectations535 536.  These perceptions of professional 
role models and arbitrary or corrupt professors can lead to exacerbated academic dishonesty 
as well537.  Such ubiquitous incentivization can allow for widespread cheating by providing 
constant opportunities538.  If incentives are so universal and available, then it could be 
possible that students have been indirectly socialized to cheat, and that cheating is seen not as 
deviant behavior, but the norm. 
   10.2.2.2.) Peer Socialization 
 A major reason that students cheat is the comprehensive socialization of this corrupt 
practice among their peers.  Russian student peer groups and operate in a particularly insular 
and demanding way, which can greatly influence their members' beliefs and behavior, even 
causing them to actively participate in academically dishonest behavior539.  Peer pressure and 
peer views' influence can be understood in terms of incentivization schema described in 
Roland Fryer's examination of "acting white" among other works in the field.  Peer groups 
form their own value systems and project them on other group-identifying peers, with very 
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tangible results in terms of behavior540.  Not only does this model allow for a rudimentary 
reconciliation of rational decision-making with student behavior, but it also allows for a much 
more effective model that rationalizes students' counterproductive behavior in a given 
environment, as supported by Akerloff and Kranton's examination of the economics of 
identity.  When an influential peer group exerts social pressure in the form of gained or lost 
prestige, that behavior is often adopted by dedicated or aspiring group members.  By 
determining their identity as one of a group member, an individual can engage in 
economically self-destructive behavior541 as a rational act of gaining valuable prestige.  
Group prestige in an environment of imperfect information and non-economic, short-term, 
student perspective can take on a superior level of value in many situations542.  This is an 
important consideration, since despite potentially major influences for a student engaging i
corrupt behavior, peer behavior may be the most significant
n 
e 
ee 
. 
543.  In fact, peer norms prov
more influential than institutional culture, should the two ever clash544.  Therefore, the degr
to which Russian students engage in academically dishonest behavior is related to the degree 
to which peer incentivization affects them
 The Fryer, Akerloff and Kranton models of irrational peer incentivization fit Russian 
student behavior in explaining academic dishonesty.  This rationale hinges on the role of a 
peer group, which is actually quite strong in Russia.  Peer groups' roles in Russia are 
especially significant; they function as "comfortable nuclei," which insulate and support 
students from a harsh, cynical and condemning outside world545.  Students take an active role 
in fostering and supporting these micro communities, which they accept non-confrontationally 
and as a model of unity546.  This kind of voluntary social isolation extends to society in 
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general, where students are strongly discouraged from taking an active role547.  Russian 
society is often considered to be an atomized social arena, where an "archipelago" of social 
groups makes up larger society548.  Such extreme polarization would place internal prestige at 
a great premium over external economic recognition.  This kind of behavior defies the rational 
human capital investment theory that has come to define large amounts of scholarship.  By 
not acquiring necessary skills via academic dishonesty, cheaters are denying themselves the 
benefits of their human capital investment.  Since investments in education and future 
earnings are valued at a much lower level than temporary peer prestige549, students are 
consciously engaging in personal economic sabotage that defies their long-term economic 
self-interest.  This concept is especially revealing, considering that although 87% of Russian 
students cheat, only 7% think of cheating as approvable550.  This shows that a great number of 
students are active cheaters, despite an ambivalent attitude.  In fact, students around the world 
have been proven to be most influenced by perceived peer cheating, which is often 
overestimated551.  In another light, the most significant way of reducing academic dishonesty 
is in creating peer disapproval for such actions552.  The degree to which Russian peers 
actually engage in approval and disapproval would therefore be a leading indicato
pervasiveness of academic dishonesty. 
r of the 
 Cheating among Russian students is prolific and highly incentivized by peers.  For 
many Russians, the approval of cheating is an essential, even obligatory step to fit in with 
their peers553.  In terms of peer group assimilation, nearly 95% of Russian students see their 
friends as cheaters554.  The act of informing on potential cheaters is incredibly damning, and 
any policing of students by other students is thoroughly de-incentivized555.  Deviation from 
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expected norms of behavior can readily cause ostracism and other consequences within peer 
groups556.  Furthermore, students are surrounded by encouragement and support from their 
peers.  While many as 87% of students actively cheat, and only 3% condemn it557.  This 
shows that 80% of Russian students are ambivalent cheaters, and 10% of Russians are 
ambivalent non-participants.  This is a negative trend in the sense that student opinions about 
cheating are the best predictors of their eventual cheating behavior558.  Even more telling is 
that those who condemn cheating do so primarily due to the technique's ineffectiveness559.  In 
essence, they are surrounded by a cultural phenomenon of cheating much as they are by 
corruption, with a parallel incentivization scheme.  In this kind of environment, many students 
have come to engage in cheating regularly, even habitually560.  Once a student has adopted 
the identity of a member of a student or peer group, it is possible to resist social obligations 
adopting extremely negative behaviors to avoid stress
by 
561, but this is not a reliable corrector of 
dishonest behavior. 
 Habitual cheating behavior, when surrounded by incentivization for compliance and 
deincentivzation for deviance, very effectively demonstrates how corrupt behavior can be 
socialized, even when demonstrably harming the student's own future human capital 
development.  This is underscored by how once an identity is adopted, it becomes 
permanently internalized and a source of anxiety if broken562.  It is important to note that an 
individual does have the ability to choose which identity to adopt, within certain limitations; 
the choice of an institution of higher education can serve as an example of such a decision, 
due to its socializing effects on students563.  There is no guarantee, however, that this choice 
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is made either rationally or with sufficient information.  The role of non-peer policing, 
however, requires special consideration. 
   10.2.2.3) Policing Cheating and Corruption 
 Cheating behavior, and thereby corrupt behavior, can be effectively policed.  When 
those in positions of authority sincerely monitor and regulate the behavior of students during 
exams, cheating can be substantially reduced.  In one famous instance, at a prestigious 
Russian university, a cheating experiment was undertaken where exams were administered in 
two ways, labeled "European" and "Russian"564.  "Russian"-style examinations were carried 
out in the traditional way, with the students' teachers during the semester administering their 
final exams and under typical university cheating monitoring and punishment policies.  The 
"European" method, however, used exam monitors who had no prior contact with the 
students, and who explained the new policy regarding cheating and punishment very clearly.  
The Russian-style produced no observable changes in student behavior, but the European 
style led to a stunning drop in observed cheating behavior among students within a 
semester565.  This means that Russian students either devised new and undetectable cheating 
methods, that they somehow compromised the monitor, or that they overcame years of 
socialization and incentivzation to take an exam honestly. 
 This kind of behavioral change demonstrates that under a proper policing policy, 
highly socialized corrupt behavior can be reduced or even removed.  The combination of 
effective communication of expectations, monitoring, and actual punishment led to a sudden 
change of incentivization structures.  In this environment, at least for graduate students, it can 
be safely concluded that Russian students were acting in a way to better ensure their academic 
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success.  This effect is demonstrated in the way that students engage in academic dishonesty 
only insofar as such behavior is incentivized566.  This is not to say that attempts at covering 
up other students' successful dishonest activity ceased, but it does speak to the overa
effectiveness of changing a key part of the cheating incentive.  Such results are an excellent 
representation of the traditional and rational view of cheating's "criminal theory," which 
emphasizes the primacy of perceived opportunity in academically dishonest acts
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567.  If this 
opportunity can be removed via policing, then perhaps academic dishonesty and corruption 
are not a function of identity or socialized behavior but of simple institutional failure in 
providing excessive opportunities to transgress, which later serve as an environment that 
affects an individual's identity.  Therefore, if this example is to be considered representative 
of overall student behavior, then either corrupt behavior is not irreversibly socialized, or 
students respond more to real incentivization than to their own socialized behavior in terms of 
cheating.  Thus, cheating and corrupt behavior can be regulated in the traditional economic 
sense - by transforming packages of incentives. 
 10.3.) Implications 
 The implications of widespread and successful academic dishonesty are the same as 
those presented by all of the other types of academic corruption that students directly 
participate in, representing especially damaging implications for engendering future corrupt 
behavior.  Essentially, cheating on exams is a form of grading corruption or accreditation 
corruption that does not include a complicit authority figure or bribery.  This kind of 
corruption poses exactly the same implications for human capital development in terms of a 
denial of training and the false signaling of graduates' abilities.  Furthermore, successfully 
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cheating on accreditation examinations can lead to exactly the same problems of 
incompetence in valuable sectors of society posed by corruption.  The loss of credibility that 
is suffered from producing unqualified specialists damages existing levels of trust in 
accreditation organizations.  This may also lead to a collapse in trust, even though the source 
of this activity is regular citizens, not necessarily institutions that unintentionally issue 
accreditation to undeserving professionals.  Authorities remain sincere, but powerless, which 
can seriously undermine confidence in institutions’ fundamental effectiveness.  This kind of 
distinction is essential in understanding another dimension of the socialization of corruption 
among academically dishonest students. 
 Academic dishonesty is a perfect incubator for future corrupt activity due to the role 
that is played by the student.  Students, who are essentially independent actors in terms of 
choosing to engage in academic dishonesty, take it upon themselves to break essential rules of 
conduct in order to enjoy the resulting benefits.  This particular environment puts the student 
in the place of the corrupt authority, who is accountable to a policing agent, the professor.  In 
this particular activity, the student isn’t merely exposed to a world of institutionalized 
corruption, but she becomes the source of corruption and can later draw conclusions about the 
value of continuing such a practice later in life.  Furthermore, academic dishonesty often 
occurs in groups, which resemble the mutually protecting corrupt-acting krugi found in public 
life568.  In fact, cheating is a way to teach students "the ABCs" of corrupt economic 
activity569.  This kind of situation creates an excellent microcosm for generating and 
observing the corrupt behavior that is found throughout Russia. 
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11.) DIPLOMA MILLS 
 One kind of higher educational institution that encompasses all aspects of educational 
corruption is the diploma mill.  A diploma mill is an institution that exists for the sole purpose 
of satisfying demand for corrupt academic services, examples of which have existed in the 
West since the 18th century570.  In the Russian Federation, false degrees are common, and are 
considered a serious problem by the national education ministry.  Estimates claim that as 
many as 200,000 people have gotten jobs due to fake diplomas571.  The presence of such 
diploma mills serves as both evidence of the extent of higher educational corruption and its 
socialization.  If there were not widespread acceptance of educational corruption on the part 
of students, the demand for such services would be very low.  In fact, a cursory examination 
of Russian press reveals dozens of advertisements for fake degrees from "any university"572.  
In a more cynical sense, there is an impression that the cheapest universities are simply 
glorified diploma mills that insist on the ritual of attending classes rather than selling a fake 
diploma directly573.  Unfortunately, methods to reduce the number of diploma mills and fake 
degrees have been so far unsuccessful574.  Diploma mills also carry all of the implications of 
selection corruption and grading corruption, but to an even greater degree.  Since the 
institution is fundamentally corrupt, by even taking part in it, a student demonstrates 
acceptance of corrupt practices.  Furthermore, the extent to which these kinds of degrees are 
valuable demonstrates that corrupt behavior is rewarded in certain contexts, and is considered 
a means of social advancement. 
 Diploma mills are very well represented in doctoral education. In the Russian 
Federation, there has been a major jump in doctoral dissertations, which has been mostly due 
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to the increase in dissertations for sale575.  For example, as many as 20-30% of all defended 
dissertations are estimated to be written on demand by a professional dissertation specialist576.  
Unfortunately, there is a widespread perception of doctoral and dissertation corruption in 
Russia577.  Despite the increase in false dissertations, Ph.D holders seem to be indifferent to 
this trend578.  The dissertation market has prices that range from $300 to $50,000, depending 
on the prestige and professional value579.  This kind of pricing may be justified to corrupt 
consumers, because outside of academia, both real and fake Ph.Ds are often assumed to be 
real580.  Whereas other types of higher education corruption cause future corrupt behavior in 
students and graduates, diploma mills are indicators of the existing level of corruption among 
students who seek their services.  Other corruption forms can present especially damaging 
consequences by increasing the overall level of corrupt actors in society.  This socialization 
effect, however, is subject to important mitigating factors. 
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12.) SOCIALIZATION MITIGATION 
 12.1.) Historical legacy 
 The historical legacy of corruption in Russia could produce and perpetuate modern 
levels of corruption independent of the status of higher education institutions.  As noted 
before, the levels of corruption in the Soviet Union were so universal that Russian society has 
continued to suffer from their effects to the current day.  In terms of perceptions of corruption, 
societal cynicism towards the government persists, independent of other reforms.  
Furthermore, massive systemic shocks created such a high level of openly corrupt activity that 
such behavior became a fact of life for many.  Therefore, a question is raised about to what 
degree contemporary corruption in higher education could be considered decisive in 
determining overall levels of Russian corruption.  This objection can be partially answered by 
looking at the recent history of the Russian Federation. Communist legacies persist, but 
individual behavior was profoundly shaped by the chaotic 1990s as well.  The changes in the 
educational sector alone demonstrate the degree to which historical expectations and trends 
may no longer be applicable in modern Russia.  After twenty years of non-communist 
government and a fundamentally different institutional environment, it would be overly 
simplistic to assume that cultural legacies are the primary determinants of corrupt behavior.  
The effects of a functioning higher education system's role in combating and influencing 
corruption may be significant to an even greater degree than Russia's particularly corrupt 
history. 
 Higher education plays a unique role in policing corruption in any social environment.  
This is reflected in how high-quality education and social renewal are considered effective 
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ways to reduce corruption in certain cases581.  Increased human capital and higher per capita 
income also serve to reduce corruption582.  Therefore, a compromised higher education 
system may still be serving the role as corruptor of future generations, but not directly.  It 
could be via the denial of a very valuable source of corruption reduction that higher education 
corruption creates harmful environment for human capital realization.  Therefore, the value of 
higher education as an institution must be included in a serious examination of societal 
corruption. Higher education is related to another important vector for reducing corruption 
that is not related to socialization alone. 
 12.2.) Labor Market and Inequality 
 Corruption can also be caused by inequality, which is independent of socialization.  
This social condition undermines mutual trust583 and exacerbates scarcity, which lead to 
increased corruption.  The primary means of overcoming such inequality is increased 
economic affluence, which grants an educated individual greater influence.  This is achieved 
via enhancing one's earnings as the result of higher education boosting the labor market value 
and earning potential of a non-empowered individual584.  However, with a corrupt system of 
higher education, academic achievement does not resolve issues of poverty nor does it 
consistently raise income585.  Levels of higher academic achievement do not directly lead to 
increased levels of earnings, and as many as 43% of Russian graduates actively strive to get a 
second college degree in order to make up for a bad choice of a major as an undergraduate586.  
This trend explains the unusual statistic that twice as many students are admitted to Russian 
higher education institutions than graduated from high schools in 2007587. 
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 Unfortunately, the labor market in Russia is "completely deformed588."  The nature of 
the Russian labor market defies traditional measurement attempts, since as much as 50% of 
Russian temporary work is based on informal agreements, and 10-12% of Russians work on 
the basis of a verbal agreement589.  Moreover, even if one is presented with an increased 
income, one may very realistically choose to become corrupt due to corrupt opportunities and 
socialized corrupt behavior590.  This deformation is especially severe, since not even the 
chronic labor shortage591 592 can compel employers to change their hiring and compensation 
policies.  In the Russian Federation about 70% of graduates expect to get work via mutual 
contacts, not via open labor market competition, thereby obviating the objective signaling role 
of their institutions.  In fact, the number of students who expect to find a job on their 
professional merits alone is only about 16%593.  In this environment, even if a student had an 
honestly earned university degree, then it is entirely likely that a personal contact would 
determine their career path, not signaled merit.  Due to this ineffective labor market, 
educational benefits may not be possible for reducing corruption. 
 Distorted labor market conditions squander human capital and can cause societal 
corruption independently of higher education.  Unfortunately, many crucial positions in the 
Russian Federation are terribly underpaid – doctors, professors, policemen, soldiers and 
bureaucrats.  The human capital investments made in these sectors are wasted, due to human 
capital losing its value without the presence of a sufficient mechanism to realize its 
potential594.  In state-dominated sectors, the labor market doesn’t truly exist, since 
government near-monopsony artificially determines labor market conditions.  Low levels of 
pay, poor working conditions and entrenched corruption can produce corrupt behavior in all 
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of these economic areas.  The transmission of workplace skills does not occur in a vacuum, 
often accompanied by essential organizational values as well.  It is also possible that co-
workers, assuming the roles of one’s peers, could influence professionals to behave in 
dishonest ways, even if they emerged from higher education without any internalization of 
corrupt behavior.  There have been opportunities to become private doctors or teach at private 
universities for nearly twenty years, but despite this phenomenon, the healthcare and 
educational sectors remain the most corrupt in Russia as of June 2009595.  Even though more 
research must be done to address these caveats, there are reasons to put them in context of 
higher education corruption as a competing influence. 
 Labor market distortion may be a trailing indicator of the results of corrupt higher 
education.  The implications of higher education corruption very closely parallel the dilemmas 
facing the current workforce and Russian society in general.  Labor market distortions due to 
government influence may be caused by simple state inadequacies, but widespread corrupt 
behavior is a major implication of grading, selection and accreditation corruption, as well as 
academic dishonesty.  Furthermore, in an absence of hard data, it could be just as easily 
contended that higher education is the cause of mass elite corruption than the result.  The 
essential question is precisely where workers and professionals acquire their corrupt habits, 
which creates even more questions in an overall examination of this problem. 
 12.3.) Alternative Influences 
  12.3.1.) Secondary Education 
 The widespread ability of students to effectively adapt to a corrupt higher educational 
environment implies that they may already be veterans of such behavior before entering a 
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university.  Corruption in Russian education isn't isolated to higher education.  Primary and 
secondary education also have high levels of corruption in terms of arbitrary behavior596 
academic dishonesty, and selection corruption597.  In terms of previously addressed topics of 
corruption, the current higher education student body is already well-versed.  From 2001-
2005, the levels of student participation in secondary education corruption increased from 
13.2% to 41%598.  Poor EGE results demonstrate the degree to which high school exam 
bribery and grading corruption have permeated the system599.  Certain corruption mechanisms 
are in wide use in high schools as well, such as the ubiquitous tutor acting as a corrupt 
services broker600. 
 As for abusive behavior and professional misconduct, there are widespread reports of 
physical and emotional trauma inflicted on students by their teachers; this kind of treatment 
has become internalized and normalized by students601.  Unfortunately, this abuse can cause 
serious physical and emotional harm602, which leads to widespread feelings of resentment 
towards authority in general603.  This effect is complicated by the powerful and durable role 
of an ascriptive identity provided from an authority figure604.  If a student is repeatedly 
labeled an idiot or deviant, she may come to behave as one.  In these institutions, it is entirely 
possible that corruption is socialized before a student enters a university, since teachers often 
serve as role models of acceptable adult behavior for students605.  In terms of soft skills, the
is an increased effectiveness of soft skill formation in earlier years rather than later in 
education
re 
 - 606.  As for the initial choice of engaging in corruption before entering a university
bribery for admissions - many students have internalized this behavior even before their 
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contact with the higher education institution itself607.  Therefore, corrupt universities could 
merely "finishing schools" of corruption, rather than the primary influence on future behavior. 
  12.3.2.) Family 
 A student's family is a major behavior-shaping influence, which acts as a source of 
socialization independent of higher education.  With regards to abusive behavior, parents are 
often active supporters of such practices, feeling that it serves as a way to better raise their 
children608.  This kind of behavior is reinforced by the Soviet model of professors routinely 
criticizing and humiliating their students in class, invoking such terms as "idiot, wretch and 
cretin" with reckless abandon609.  As mentioned in previous profile of Russian students, 
parents play a key role in the choice of a student's institution and major.  With regards to 
academic dishonesty, parents have been known to help their children in cheating on exams610.  
In terms of actually realizing corrupt transactions, parents often provide the necessary finance 
and influence.  Some parents bribe their child's way through elementary school and high 
school, which causes unruly behavior and a passive acceptance of the value in corrupt 
activity611.  The use of corrupt influence is at such a level that most affluent and influential 
families engage in such activity regardless of their children's ability, preferring to guarantee 
their access to higher education in the most secure way possible612.  Additionally, when 
universities do not provide complete or acceptable socialization models, the family usually 
compensates for it613.  If, for example, parents who refused to engage in corrupt activity could 
provide an effective model of ethical behavior.  Finally, students often remain at home during 
their time in a university and beyond, which constantly puts them into contact with their 
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parents.  Depending on the nature of their interaction, a parent could influence equal to other 
competing social influences. 
  12.3.3.) Social Corruption Immersion 
 Overall Russian societal corruption and perceptions of corruption could be another 
source of socialization.  Unfortunately, corruption has absolutely saturated all public and 
private aspects of Russian society614.  Experience with the corrupt health care system, the 
corrupt police force or other individual examples could have a strong formative effect on 
Russia's youth.  Higher education corruption, after all, is estimated to be only 10-20% of all 
corrupt transactions in Russia615, which provides for many opportunities to come into contact 
with corruption in other spheres of society.  According to some experts, Russia is perceived to 
have "a culture of piracy and forgery"616.  In terms of professional corruption, it is perceived 
that almost every Russian is a participant617.  Many Russian institutions are seen as corrupt by 
default, and higher education is no exception618 619.  In fact, according to Temple and Petrov's 
work, higher education corruption is perceived as only a part of a much broader system of 
societal corruption620.  In this kind of institutional environment, it seems that higher education 
may not be a leading producer of corrupt behavior, but a leading indicator of an overall level 
of societal corruption.  In a remarkable example, only 40% of Russians have declared that 
they are completely unwilling to bribe in order to enter a university, leaving 60% that are 
either ready to do it or would consider such an opportunity621.  Therefore it seems entirely 
possible that Russian students could be entering their universities already corrupted by the 
society around them. 
  12.3.4.) Higher Education as a Unique Influence 
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 Higher education is uniquely significant in socializing corruption among Russian 
students, which is potentially greater than other alternative influences.  Whereas preschool, 
elementary school and secondary education can instill harmful soft skills, corrupt behavior is 
not necessarily determined in these institutions more than in any other.  Socialization 
implications are more significant for higher education, since it specifically affects a nation's 
talented youth, including their value formation and their future behavior in positions of 
authority622.  This is an essential consideration, since corrupt universities indirectly teach and 
reward graduates who engaged in corruption623.  This observation is especially important to 
consider, since many students in secondary education firmly believe in the "fairness of the 
educational system, despite reports of dishonesty or corruption"624.  To directly subject such 
students to corruption could fundamentally alter their perceptions and expectations. 
 In another regard, higher education is a formative phase for Russian students due to 
their relative financial independence and decision-making ability.  Whereas parents have a 
major role in facilitating corrupt activity, the way that students chose to engage in corrupt 
activity on their own via grading corruption, their own wages and acting as the primary 
decision-maker in engaging in corrupt activity is unique.  Before entering a university, a 
student's parents were approached by teachers and admissions committees, or they were the 
primary actors in a corrupt outside world.  In terms of grading corruption and accreditation 
corruption after students begin their degree program, they become the target for supply side 
corruption and the initiators of demand side corruption.  Reductions in corruption were not 
accomplished by keeping an entire generation insulated from dishonest activity, therefore at 
some point an individual must make a choice to engage in or reject corruption as a standard of 
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personal behavior.  Until a student becomes an independent, corrupt actor, their future corrupt 
activity is still in question - and a university is where this transformation can take place. 
 12.4.) Corruption Mitigation 
 12.4.1.) Inaccurate Measurement 
 A potential fundamental flaw in this examination and in all other examinations of 
corruption is the imprecise measurement of corruption.  Corruption’s hidden nature greatly 
complicates any accurate measurement or comparison, due to a lack of simple verification625 
626.  This complicated environment forces any analyst to rely on incomplete and anecdotal 
evidence, which can misrepresent the problem as a whole627 628.  There are some methods to 
reliably collect corruption information629, but only in a limited sense.  As shown earlier, 
perceptions of corruption can be deliberately manipulated in order to serve a particular goal, 
be it political or personal.  In another sense, even sincere witness accounts may mistakenly 
identify a given act as corruption.  A survey done in Sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates this 
phenomenon, where an observing population correctly identified a government as corrupt, but 
could neither successfully identify the degree of corruption nor its mechanism630.  In this 
same survey, biases can severely inflate or reduce the amount of perceived corruption, most 
often causing inflation of the perceived quantity of corrupt actions631.  This feature, 
compounded with the inability of observers to distinguish corrupt activity from simple 
incompetence632 would undermine many efforts to accurately identify corruption on a lar
scale.  In this sense, it would be understandable why some experts would consider the exten
of Russian higher educational corruption to be “drastically exagge
ge 
t 
rated”633. 
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 Alternative explanations, however, do not eliminate the idea of corruption, since 
"corruption thrives on disorganization," which can act as a shield for corrupt acts634.  It is 
theoretically possible to measure corruption by using some broad aggregation techniques,635 
636 but these also rely on perceptions, which are often undermined by endemic biases637.    
Despite difficulties in measurement, corruption perceptions are still used to determine official 
anti-corruption policies638.  Even considering these complications, the amount of anecdotal 
evidence, official statistics and third party evaluations of corruption throughout scholarship 
about Russian higher education is significant unto itself.  Given the massive amount of visible 
corruption and corroborating accounts of such activity, it is safe to conclude that corruption 
for Russian higher education is a particularly is a serious problem that requires consideration. 
  12.4.2.) Self-Limiting Corruption 
 One major argument against the impact of corruption is that the phenomenon is self-
limiting.  In the case of bribery, increased competition and corrupt access can drive up the 
average price of bribes, which ultimately harms corrupt providers, since they have priced 
many of their potential customers out of the market.  This consideration explains why many 
bribe-givers try to hide the amount that they pay639  aside from the criminal element of the 
question.  This argument, however, is self-defeating.  Since corruption is fundamentally 
hidden, a lack of information prevents reliable market mechanisms from functioning.  In fact, 
it is up to the providers to set prices, which must be kept hidden from other participants, 
which can allow for very flexible and unequal pricing.  Another version of this self-limiting 
argument is the devaluation of the corrupt good.  Unlike medical care or police protection, 
once a university's reputation sinks sufficiently then its degrees should also lose their value640.  
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In this sense, doctoral programs and dissertations are valued in a similar way, dependent on 
their level of corruption641.  Counter to predicted market behavior, this trend has not yet been 
observed.  In fact, despite the worsening picture of educational corruption in general and 
higher education in particular, demand for higher education has consistently increased to the 
present day.  In the Russian case, corruption is not self-limiting. 
12.4.3.) Grease the Wheels 
 The traditional caveats of corruption’s benefits do not apply to Russian higher 
education.  Throughout corruption literature, there is a persistent argument that corruption 
may actually facilitate the functioning of a dysfunctional society by overcoming otherwise 
insurmountable obstacles642 643.  This allows a system to achieve a minimal "degree of 
functionality"644.  In Russia, the standard incarnation of this practice is the use of blat to 
overcome institutional weakness in production capacity645.  The means of exchange is not 
something as objective and universal as currency, but a one-time favor that could be repaid at 
a later date.  This approach sees corruption as a series of one-time occurrences that increase 
the transaction costs in an economy, but such transaction costs are actually far more damaging 
that other transaction costs, such as taxes646.  This damage can be realized due to the illegal 
nature of a corrupt transaction, its undermining of institutions and other social harms647.  
Additionally, corruption can substantially reduce investment and economic growth while 
overcoming restrictive bureaucracy648.  Specifically in terms of higher education, the 
facilitation caveat cannot be accepted649.  In fact, most of the gains that could be expected 
from corruption are short-term only, with more serious long-term systemic implications650. 
  12.4.4.) Test Case Objection 
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 Despite the dire predictions of higher education corruption, many expected 
implications have not been realized.  If the implications presented in this paper are truly as 
threatening as they are presented to be, then they should have been realized already.  As the 
Russian economy continues to grow, higher education enrollment continues to increase, and 
diplomas rise in value.  It would appear that some of these implications could be overstated in 
this context.  Furthermore, since corruption in the 1990s and the Soviet Union were so 
common, and the flaws of signaling, a flawed labor market and effective training were 
present, the current situation cannot be considered unique.  In answer to this objection, what 
might be observed today is, in fact the result of this corrupt trend.  Modern higher education 
corruption and widespread societal corruption may very well serve as a test case for the 
effects of a corrupt university system.  In fact, overall corruption in education, healthcare and 
in the private sector has grown as predicted.  In another sense, the corruption of the Soviet 
system, often the source of modern educational elites, may very well have produced those 
who oversee the massive levels of corruption today.  There is not enough direct evidence to 
draw a basic causative relationship between Soviet higher educational corruption and the 
structural corruption that permeates Russian society.  However, it would be reasonable to 
conclude that a corrupt higher educational system would greatly contribute to the perpetuation 
of such a trend.  In terms of the implications, it would be unproductive to connect Russian 
development levels with a functional higher education system.  Since much recent Russian 
economic growth was due to favorable market prices for raw materials exports651, then 
economic growth could have been achieved without effective higher education or human 
capital growth.  Thus, if such a situation has occurred, the implications of higher education 
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corruption on the Russian economy and corrupt socialization may have been partially delayed 
instead of disproven altogether.  
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13.) IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 13.1.) Political Implications 
 The current level of corruption in Russia represents a serious loss of state strength.  
The ability of corruption to usurp state policies and regulations directly and seriously weakens 
the ability of a government to govern652.  In this situation, although the state may retain its 
dominant position in the market and public life, inefficiencies and unmanageable corrupt 
actors prevent effective state functioning653.  Corruption is an explicit surrendering of social 
priorities to those of the bureaucrat, which leads to poor implementation of even the most 
beneficial programs654.   For a nation like the Russian Federation, these questions are 
especially significant, since the state is a major presence in most sectors of the economy and a 
major provider of most essential services.  Public safety, healthcare, education and 
infrastructure all will suffer if the state cannot act effectively.  In this sense, endemic Russian 
corruption is a real and damaging loss of state effectiveness and potential societal good.  
Services aside, the fundamental stability of a regime is brought into question by corruption, 
which can cause complete state capture655 or even a governmental collapse. 
An excellent case study for the damaging role of corruption in the Russian Federation 
is the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Towards the end of the Soviet era, the ultimately fatal 
question of national independence was first raised by Andropov’s anti-corruption drives, 
which were continued by Gorbachev656.  At this point, the entire Soviet elite had been 
completely compromised by corrupt self-interest, and it was widely known to “every Soviet 
citizen” that every member of the party’s leadership could be subject to a sincere and 
damaging corruption investigation657.  This effort was greatly slowed by the previously-
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mentioned overlapping krugi of corrupt mutual protection. The ultimate lack of success 
demonstrated the degree to which the country’s mutually supporting corrupt activity was 
effective, and the fear which such efforts created demonstrated how universal such corruption 
was.  Despite ongoing anti-corruption efforts, universal corruption towards the end of the 
Soviet Union eventually led to the regime's collapse for many reasons658.  This effect of 
corruption in determining the fate of the Soviet Union demonstrates that the more corrupt 
Russian society has become, the riskier it becomes to attempt to reduce corruption.  
Therefore, incremental increases in societal corruption, especially as mutually reinforcing 
elite krugi, should be considered as reinforcing the implications of corruption as well as the 
durability of corruption in general.  In fact, corruption is not only durable in this sense, but its 
very perception is a fundamentally self-perpetuating and self-renewing phenomenon. 
 13.2.) Perceptions  
 13.2.1.) Perceived Corruption versus Real Corruption 
Perceptions of corruption directly lead to further corrupt behavior.  A common refrain 
in the world of dubious business is “if I didn’t do this job, then they would just find somebody 
else, so why not me?”  Such a perception of widespread and harmful business practices serves 
to reinforce such behavior among individual actors.  Existing corruption incentivizes corrupt 
behavior in a similar way, since perceptions of corruption cause further corrupt behavior659.  
This is seen in the labor market and business via individuals engaging in corrupt behavior so 
as to not be at a competitive disadvantage against other corrupt actors660 661.  In terms of 
higher education in particular, perceptions of corruption can directly lead to corrupt 
behavior662 663.  These perceptions, even if they are actually false, can still cause the same 
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effects664, and irresponsible media coverage or sensationalizing scandals can create 
perceptions that lead to more corruption665.  The perception of corruption, even a false one, 
can engender a fundamentally harmful perspective among citizens. 
Despite their effectiveness in causing corrupt behavior, perceptions can often be 
wrong.  Corruption is a very visible phenomenon, but stubbornly unquantifiable666.  The 
hidden nature of corruption makes true observation difficult667 668, and unreliable anecdotal 
evidence is used by researchers and individual observers669.  In fact, many observations of 
corruption are fundamentally biased as the result of many potential factors670, which 
artificially increases perceived corruption671.  This condition allows for the manipulation of 
perceptions of corruption in many instances.  While corrupt actors are interested in reducing 
their own corrupt appearance, they are interested in making their competitors and political 
opponents appear corrupt.  In order to evaluate the extent of this problem, however, one issue 
remains constant – corruption is very visible, but almost entirely unquantifiable672 673.  This 
measurement flaw does not limit the effects of corruption since its perceptions can be just as 
damaging674.  This is an especially important point, since many observers incorrectly 
determine the corruption of an individual act675.  Trends such as bad organization, poor 
policing or simple incompetence can appear to be corruption in a non-transparent system676.  
Despite this flaw in perception, the increase in actual corrupt activity increases the likelihood 
that actual, damaging corrupt behavior is encountered.  In more than one analysis, perceptions 
have been empirically shown to increase occurrences of corrupt behavior by reducing 
interpersonal trust677.  At its core, faith in institutions is predicated on the trust of an 
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anonymous state actor to serve the interests of the public.  If trust in institutions is completely 
lost, even greater implications can be realized. 
  13.2.2.) Trust Collapse 
 Widespread incompetence and corruption can lead to a profoundly damaging loss of 
trust, called a "trust collapse."  A trust collapse is a situation where certain essential 
foundations of society cease to work, since large segments of the public refuse to cooperate 
with it.  This is seen when people gradually come to avoid the state as much as possible, 
seeing it as fundamentally corrupt678.  An example would be if citizens stopped obeying 
traffic laws, since traffic police are perceived as being universally corrupt679.  This trust 
collapse has been realized to an extreme, where many crimes are not reported to the police at 
all by citizens who fear becoming the victims of corrupt authorities680.  Another example 
would be if fire codes were routinely ignored, since fire inspectors will not honestly evaluate 
a building under any circumstances.  In each of these situations, unacceptable physical 
damage can be done to a population via malfunctioning institutions and the deprivation of 
essential services. 
 The fundamental value of universities, accreditation and other similar institutions is 
that their evaluative authority grants a guarantee of minimal individual competence.  Once 
that guarantee breaks down, especially amidst widespread corruption, entire sectors of a 
society can cease to function due to lack of use or over-abuse.  In terms of courts and 
government regulation, trust collapse effects can be observed in the Russian business 
environment, where entrepreneurs have come to fear bureaucrats more than criminals, and 
chronically suffer from broken contracts681.  This kind of standard has led business to be 
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conducted in an entirely improvised and informal way, placing trust above all else so that 
reliance on unreliable institutions will not become necessary682.  This kind of adaptation can 
compensate for institutional weakness in education as well, evidenced by the current labor 
market and institutional practice of only hiring via mutual acquaintances.  This caveat cannot 
mitigate overall trust collapse implications, since institutional weakness is at best offset, but 
not cured by networks683.  This logic is simple, since establishing trust requires significant 
time investments and contains inherent risk, which increases transaction costs above those 
found in a properly functioning environment of reliable, anonymous actors.  Considering the 
probability of such implications, it is important to gauge their particular severity for higher 
education. 
 A trust collapse in higher education would produce severe consequences by 
completely undermining certain key functions.  Should this trust collapse be fully realized in 
higher education, then the implications for training would be partially affected, but signaling 
would fail altogether684.  One early indicator of a possible trust collapse in higher education is 
seen in the trend of some students to not even bother applying to a university, since they see 
themselves as lacking the necessary clout to influence corrupt admissions committees685.  
More than one third of current students see the removal of corruption from the higher 
education system as fundamentally impossible686.  In this sense, huge losses in human capital 
would be realized via the waste and misallocation of resources, since many capable 
candidates are self-selecting to forego higher education completely or to resolve themselves to 
the inevitability of corruption.  The implications of a trust collapse can be best understood 
when approaching them with an historical perspective. 
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 The Soviet Union experienced more than one trust collapse, which caused irreparable 
harm to the country as a whole.  A major source of trust collapse was in the consumer 
economy, which could not produce sufficient goods to support the Soviet population687.  This 
fits the trust collapse model since, by serving as a branch of the government, consumer 
production was a state institution.  The rise of the black market and massive informal 
economies of exchange and barter came to make up for this weakness.  A complete lack of 
trust was afforded to the security services in many situations, including the police.  Another 
form of trust collapse was the loss of political legitimacy of the Bolshevik party.  Glasnost in 
the form of reduced news controls and opening secret chapters of Soviet history fatally 
undermined trust in the regime, which led to massive unrest and calls for elections688.  This 
fatally damaged the ability of the Union to maintain its integrity, while being unable to save 
itself by applying classic repressive measures.  This collapse in the state apparatus ended its 
ability to provide services in any meaningful way, which led to many of the current systemic 
pressures that are blamed for current corruption.  Even though corruption did exist in the 
Soviet university system, modern Russian higher education is at a greater risk for a trust 
collapse. 
 The Russian Federation's higher education system is more likely to generate a trust 
collapse than before due to the internalization of corrupt behavior and its observable 
consequences.  Selection corruption did exist in the Soviet Union, but universal corruption 
was not perceived as it is today689.  In today's Russia, many students claim to have entered 
universities honestly, but many still maintain perceptions of widespread dishonest 
behavior690.  This widespread perception of educational corruption can lead to very serious 
122 
systematic problems for Russian education in particular and society as a whole691 692.  One 
example can be found at Nizhny Novgorod State University, where a popular student 
perception of the administration is that "all our school managers care for is their own 
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enrichment"693. 
 In terms of student participation in corrupt behavior, bribery's stigma has long ago 
been mollified by the common euphemism "informal fees"694.  This commercial socializatio
can also be seen in how some students have internalized and normalized the purchasing of 
exam grades - seeing it as a routine practice695.  Some groups of students engage in organized
bribery so as to get a better price; recently a whole class collected 150,000 RUR to purchase
grades collectively so as to maximize the value for their bribe696.  Finally, in a particular
sobering light for policymakers, recent empirical surveys have demonstrated that many 
students and their families do not see any connection between their individual efforts and the 
quality of their education.  In an even more telling survey, only 33% of Russians believe th
their admission to a university depends on their academic ability697.  This trend raises the 
unpleasant possibility that Russian education may devolve into nothing more than a "symboli
institution"698, which cannot meet the training and human capital needs of th
kind of collapse can lead to significant long-term damage to any institution. 
 A trust collapse fundamentally undermines an institution's functioning in several ke
ways.  First of all, the services are denied to a population, which ultimately comes to stop 
using it altogether.  This kind of atrophy is compounded by the fact that recruiting efforts and 
institutional renewal efforts are comprehensively frustrated.  An artificial restriction on future
cadre renewal is created, since those seeking employment in this sector will be likely to
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to corrupt benefits first, rather than last.  Attracting complicit talent and a hierarchical 
reinforcement mechanism of centralized corruption would create a self-renewing corruption
mechanism.  In this context, only an external source of anti-corruption enforcement would 
have a hope of restoring such a thoroughly compromised institution.  Furthermore, the sector 
that this institution occupies cannot grow naturally or healthily.  In another sense, when a state 
or its institutions are seen as petty or predatory, corruption becomes an accepted fact of 
life
 
 
nificant level of societal corruption would produce its own 
699.  To an even greater degree, corruption itself could be interpreted as an absence of 
functional institutions700.  In this regard, the more widespread a trust collapse becomes, the 
more corrupt a society becomes, which then function as mutually reinforcing phenomena.  
This effect is multiplied by the fundamental role of education in the reproduction of Russian
society701.  Such a sig
consequences for the Russian Federation. 
 13.3.) Economic Implications  
  13.3.1.) Macroeconomic Implications 
 Corruption is substantially damaging to a nation's economy.  Corruption could
seriously harm a nation's economic growth, overall income levels and investment
 
 
nt to 
fit 
702. 
Additional harm can be realized via increased inefficiencies and reduced economic growth
because of misappropriation of public funds703.  A primary way that corruption can harm 
economic growth in Russia is through market distortion.  Corruption is a major impedime
business and the overall effectiveness of the private sector704 705.  Private firms can seek 
competitive advantage over each other through government policies that arbitrarily bene
them and harm their competitors.  Despite the popularity of such practices, engaging in 
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corrupt activity often harms firm growth706.  This kind of activity is aided by a chronically 
weak Russian institutional environment, which would otherwise be key in fostering business 
development707.  This kind of policy prevents consumers from benefiting from a competiti
market, which can allow monopolies to form to the expense of the population
ve 
owth709, 
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 but these consequences require more detailed investigation in 
rms o arke
708.  Corrupt 
behavior can greatly dissuade market entry from new firms and restrict new firm gr
which has caused even more market damage in the modern Russian Federation710. 
 Another factor that is relevant in this respect is that firms cannot be held accountable 
by the market, which de-incentivizes any kind of innovation in order to earn and protect on
revenue711.  When a firm's market position isn't achieved, but merely rented from decisive 
regulators, there is no reason to seek any reform from primary stakeholders.  Since market
entry is profoundly difficult in the current Russian economy and established interests are
decisive712 these stakeholders show no likelihood of changing soon.  Therefore, private 
enterprise can also become a predatory presence in Russia's corrupt society by both corruptly 
profiting at the expense of other interests and perpetuating a corrupt environment by this ver
practice.  Since this kind of corruption is the result of regulatory and institutional failure, 
serves as a self-perpetuating phenomenon that costs an economy a great deal in terms of 
squandered efficiencies713 714.  From the individual firm perspective, damages from 
corruption are highly visible,
te f m t-wide human capital. 
  13.3.2.) Reducing Human Capital 
   13.3.2.1.) Infrastructure and Labor Market 
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 Corruption in society can affect existing human capital and its subsequent 
production715.  This harm can be realized in several ways.  Human capital requires important 
systemic support, which Russia unfortunately lacks716.  Insufficient systemic support c
prevent human capital accumulation, due not to a lack of incentives but a lack of opportunities 
for actors to improve their own human capital
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717.  The lack of a competitive business 
environment and the inability of small firms to diversify the private sector restrict both overa
economic growth and human capital realization718.  As described above, the Russian labor 
market is far from an ideal means of realizing national human capital, which could frustrat
even the most productive higher education systems.  An uncompetitive labor market prevents 
the effective realization of human capital potential, since the most appropriate candidates 
cannot find optimal placement.  Abusive policies, poor wages and other harmful elements can
make for very attractive relative terms for working in other countries.  An unsuitable nation
labor market is no longer a barrier for t
given the modern international labor market, which u
national human capital accumulation. 
   13.3.2.2.) Brain Drain 
 Brain drain is often the direct result of corruption or systemic pressures that result 
from corruption, representing serious economic implications.  As of 2006, polls showe
as much as 70% of Russia's youth was ready to emigrate719.  The first waves of brain drain
the 1990s were the result of economic hardship.  A major impetus for researchers and 
academics to leave in this period was the removal of major sources of state funding720.  In 
terms of higher education, it is estimated that nearly 70,000 academics went abroad721.  
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another regard, it is estimated that more than 200,000 scientists and specialists left Russia 
during the early post-Soviet period722.  The degree of economic damage to the Russian 
Federation as a result of this effect can be estimated in terms of unrealized economic potenti
of émigrés.  The size of such damage is considerable - equal to the entire annual budget of the
Russian Federation
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723.  Some authors point to notable Russian inventors throughout hi
who realized their talents in the United States, producing such innovations the televisi
helicopter724.  The brain drain also serves as a trailing indicator of Russia's economic 
potential; its presence demonstrates that Russia does not and can n
knowledge economy in its current state725.  Furthermore, the idea of brain drain isn't simp
related to the material hardships presented by a corrupt market.   
 In terms of institutional renewal and Russian human capital levels, brain drain is 
especially threatening.  Brain drain poses a serious threat to Russia's higher education 
renewal, due to the finest academic talent leaving for better professional opportunities abroad
which could be as much as 30-60% of Russia's "scholarly potential"726.  The conditions 
pay and professional success appeal much more to younger educators than the remaining 
Soviet elite727 728, but the ability of the university system to renew itself remains very much 
question.  In fact, Russian Ph D's are increasing in quantity but increasingly rejecting caree
in academia729.  Many Russian specialists that spend considerable time in the West actually 
choose to continue to live abroad due to a perceived lack of corruption instead of material 
factors alone730.  The brain drain implications for Russia are especially serious.  The Russian 
Federation must develop and train all of its own human capital, since the labor market does 
not allow for the attraction of competitive specialists from abroad731.  The effects of the bra
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drain, however, may be mitigated by a dropping level of specialist emigration and the high
level of Russian specialists returning to Russia, at a greater rate than either China or India
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who greatly contribute to the economy732.  However, unlike C
drain is often seen as permanent733, which poses greater long-term risks for the country. 
  13.3.3.) Reduced Human Capital Implications 
 Corruption directly harms human capital formation734.  Having determined that higher 
education corruption significantly harms the formation and realization of human capital in the 
Russian Federation, it is important to look at the larger implications of this trend.  As
the ongoing examination of corruption being spread via human capital, the primary dangers of 
flawed human capital production can be realized in two ways.  First, human capital 
implications can be examined via a larger, macroeconomic perspective of the value of hu
capital in general, including lost potential due to its non-realization.  Secondly, an a
particularly valuable sectors of the economy that depends on expertise can demonstrate 
individual impacts.  As mentioned in the individual corruption sections, especially 
accreditation corruption, socially vital areas of an economy will function at dangerously 
inadequate levels.  Institutional strength is considerably dependent on human capital, as are 
most components of a functional society735.  Therefore, reductions in human capital c
greater institutional weakness - multiplying the effects of a corrupt and dysfunctional socie
This is an especially pertinent implication considering that Russian higher education 
corruption prevents the production valuable specialists736.  While examining such effects, 
however, it must be remembered that human capital exists in a system throughout the 
professional life of a worker.  Therefore, if a system begins to produce flawed human capital
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all of a sudden, existing functional human capital can still be productive until completely 
replaced, thereby mitigating the overall systemic impacts.  In this context, it is important to 
s of flawed production that 
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 kinds 
examine the existing human capital supply, and potential source
m ve originated earlier than the beginning of the Putin era. 
   13.3.3.1.) Ruinous Soviet Legacy 
 Current and recent Russian human capital are not determined by current higher 
education alone.  Although higher education corruption will affect future human capital, 
current low levels of human capital can be attributed to a few factors.  First of all, Russia
inherited a great amount of its current human capital, including that working in the education 
industry, from the Soviet Union737.  The effectiveness of the Soviet educational system 
therefore is being realized in today's economy.  This inheritance immediately lost a great deal
of its value due to the fundamental changes in Russian society after the fall, and it continued 
to suffer due to ongoing and overwhelming systemic shocks738.  Furthermore, the chan
the system created a demand for a completely different type of specialist739 740.  Qualificati
and education requirements completely changed, rendering Soviet human capital "not
applicable" to the modern Russian economy741.  Furthermore, the labor market became fa
more fluid and unstable due to a laborer's ability to switch jobs freely and the highly 
unpredictable future for many former state enterprises.  In another trend, one of the most 
important blows to the human capital in the Soviet Union was the massive exodus of 
specialists overseas in the 1990s.  Another reason why Soviet human capital suddenly lost its
value was a major shift in higher education, which could not meet the demand for new
of human capital, nor replace lost productivity742.  Marxist economics evaporated overnight, 
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and social sciences that were previously politically sensitive suddenly required a new 
approach743 744.  The success of the Soviet system was predicated on producing specialists fo
an isolated and specific system.  By eliminating the monopoly role of the state and exposing 
this system to a relatively free
r 
 market, human capital's ability to self-replenish was critically 
nderm ed745 nfor  from many of the 
unrealized 
n 
 society 
on 
In this 
u in . U tunately, the higher education system is still suffering
results of the volatile 1990s. 
   13.3.3.2.) Full Circle Higher Education Corruption 
 Higher education is an excellent example of the potential damage done by 
human capital potential.  In Russia, as in most economies around the world, higher educatio
is provided by those that have themselves received an exceptionally high level of 
education746.  In other words, those that have been exposed the longest to higher education 
then are entrusted to reproduce it.  Thus, provided that the proposed implications of corrupt 
higher education are valid, the area that would see their emergence most vividly would be in 
new higher education professionals.  This can be reflected in the trend that the more a Russian 
student is exposed to higher education, the more her cultural values reflect those of the
around her747.   One example of this is the implied reasoning behind the dearth of research 
dissertation corruption.  According to Osipian, self-protecting academic professionals 
consciously ignore and suppress research on the subject in order to protect themselves748.  
Furthermore, the prevalence of dissertation and doctoral program corruption implies that 
many corrupt professionals have found positions in higher educational institutions749.  
respect, harmful human capital production is self-renewing.  A corrupt higher educational 
system will reproduce itself via poor teaching quality, the reproduction of a culture of 
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corruption and reducing the overall value of dissertations750.  Furthermore, the lack of new 
academic professionals and the fact that 47% of teachers are at retirement age demonstrates 
the extent to which the current faculties of many Russian universities still depend on residual 
Soviet-era human capital751.  The ability of higher education to replace these professionals, 
especially the honest ones, is in serious doubt752.  This unfortunate condition persists in light
of the seemingly contradictory phenomenon that increased Ph.D production in Russia do
not produce large n
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umbers of academics753.  A weak educational infrastructure can increase 
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uture 
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advancement and enrichment.  This could also lead to further institutional harm in the sense 
corruption, because weakened education creates weakened institutions and a weakened 
society overall754. 
 Finally, full-circle corruption can destroy the effectiveness of any institution and 
further squander human capital potential.  Since leadership positions and elite renewal are 
accomplished through higher education, the production of corrupt or otherwise ineffective 
professionals would lead to a perpetuation of a corrupt system.  In another important way, 
corruption can reform the incentive structure for graduates, attracting them to corrupt sectors 
of the economy for rent-seeking and bribery opportunities755.  Whereas business elites tend to 
provide education for their children overseas, bureaucrats and government elites' preferenc
for Russian universities renders the Russian education system as a major determinant of f
Russian elite composition756.  In this sense, the best human capital can be squandered via 
placement of the most promising talent in abusive positions, who then seek to maximiz
corrupt profits instead of making real contributions to society.  This kind of incentivization is
entirely understandable, especially when corruption is a very visible means of reliable 
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that even capable elites and professionals would willingly restrict the system that they 
participate in so as to maximize corrupt benefits.  This persistently low level of educational 
es757. 
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quality can have serious effects on a country's human capital rat
   13.3.3.3.) Human Capital's Value 
 Human capital is a critical part of a modern economy, and damage that it suffers can
cause widespread harm.  As stated by Alfred Marshall in 1890 - "The most valuable of all 
capital is that invested in human beings758."  In specific terms of higher education, the 
benefits that it presents for increased human capital and economic growth are significant,
especially for transition economies759.  The systemic weaknesses in the Russian economy 
could be exacerbated by this trend, since human capital is also a source of valuable social 
capital760.  For developing economies, human capital is a necessary, but not sufficient 
prerequisite for significant economic growth761, as evidenced by Russia's relatively high 
international human capital levels, but consistently underperforming economic growth762
fact, human capital is key to the future economic growth and international competitiveness of
a country in the modern, globalized economy763.  This globalized perspective is essentia
since even though human capital alone may not be sufficient to ensure economic growth, it is 
an essential ingredient of a modern country's economic survival in the 20th century764.  F
returns on current human capital investments in science and technology are very high765, 
which is particularly good for Russia.  One of the most promising areas of Russian human 
capital is the large and competitive IT sector, which could provide significant economic 
growth if it were ever to be properly developed766.  Unfortunately, national policy has 
neglected developing this economic sector in favor of raw materials production, despite 
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promising developments in Moscow, Saint Petersburg and Novosibirsk - the "Siberian Silicon
Valley
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767."  This lack of investment in a primary part of a
the potential implications for a corrupt Russian government human capital policy. 
 The premier model of future economic development, a "knowledge economy," cann
be achieved with existing Russian human capital policies.  Older models of industrial and 
natural resource wealth are no longer sufficient to ensure long-term economic growth, sin
although production potential is important, the widespread use of knowledge will be the 
primary determinant of twenty-first century economic effectiveness768.  This goal is evaluate
in terms of a specific kind of human capital, which is produced from higher education.  The 
Russian educational system can ensure basic literacy and numeracy, but more sophisticated 
specialists are not commonly produced by the higher education system.  This has re
an unfortunate situation where the Russian Federation needs to import many of its 
specialists769, since most specialists produced by the Russian higher education system are do
not meet human capital needs770.  Although the Russian economy is growing, this does not 
justify human capital development policies, since this was mostly due to favorable marke
prices for raw materials exports771.  Furthermore, Russian human capital development is 
neglected by policymakers, even though it certainly requires state policy solutions to be 
successfully realized772.  This further complicates overall Russian economic development, 
since increased growth creates an increased need for human capital - thereby exacerbati
shortages and limiting competitiveness773.  This difficult situation can lead to a further 
reduction of human capital due to the primacy of human capital intensive technologies in the 
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global market774.  A lack of major human capital production in such a crucial economic se
demonstrates how the private sector could suffer from a lack of focused state involvem
 Human capital is particularly valuable for the Russian private sector.  It has been 
argued that the only truly unique resource that any business could claim is its human
capital
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775.  This would explain why many firms seek to develop their own human capi
reserves via serious training initiatives.  The advantages to developing this asset are 
numerous, especially in the area of improved organizational performance and overall 
productivity776.  In fact, the critical ability of any organization to transform or adapt to an 
ever-changing market is provided by developed human capital777.  Therefore, advanced 
human capital development is essential for the survival or Russia's private sector778.  It should 
be noted that Russian firms' human capital development policies do not often aim at long-
development, but merely adapting workers and managers to their current tasks - compensa
for shortcomings in education779.  Considering this approach, it is doubtful as to whether 
current Russian private training initiatives could a
p ed by a knowledge economy.  This troubling situation is further complicated by the
effects of corruption on human capital potential. 
 Human capital and societal corruption are fundamentally opposed concepts.  Low 
levels of human capital can directly lead to increased corruption780.  In terms of regulating 
corruption, human capital is a critical source of institutional strength781.  Poor govern
also leads to less effective human capital investment and less effective policies in this 
regard782.  From another perspective, developing human capital is a way reducing po
inequality783, which could correspondingly alleviate inequality as a cause of corrupt
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according to Uslaner's model.  This implication is doubly important for the Russian 
Federation, since potential a loss of human capital means not only a loss of current 
competitiveness, but an ongoing inability to successfully adapt to a constantly changing 
global economy.  The overall functioning of a state and the value of a nation's economy are 
therefore both undermined by corruption and enhanced by human capital.  This effect is 
enhanced by the tendency of human capital to produce gains in other forms of capital784.  In 
this context, human capital and corruption can be seen as related and mutually exclusive 
extremes of societal development, where the presence of one mitigates the other. Therefore,
corruption in t
 
he Russian higher educational system, as a means of increasing corruption and 
ducing human capital, represents a multifaceted danger to the Federation's economic and 
social health. 
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